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COMMENT 
KYOTO'S SO-CALLED 
"FATAL FLAWS": 
A POTENTIAL 
SPRINGBOARD FOR DOMESTIC 
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 10, 1997, over 180 countries, including the 
United States, established the Kyoto Protocol to address global 
warming. Despite its considerable involvement negotiating 
and drafting the Kyoto Protocol under the Clinton Administra-
tion, the United States has since, under the George W. Bush 
Administration, deemed the Protocol "fatally flawed" and has 
refused to ratify it as written.! Nonetheless, the United States 
has alternative means to reduce and limit domestic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. This Comment discusses the United 
States' capability to initiate a new domestic program to con-
front climate change in the wake of the current political stance 
on environmental issues. Additionally, this Comment proposes 
a program premised on market-based incentives that will serve 
as a compromise between industry and the environment to en-
sure that the United States takes affIrmative action to reduce 
and limit domestic GHG emissions. 
Section II of this comment discusses the various factors 
that contribute to the scientific phenomenon of global warming. 
I EPA Global Warming Publications: Bush Administration's Position (June 11, 
2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/actions/us_position 
/bush3cpol_0611 Ol.pdf at 14 (visited Jan. 2, 2002) !hereinafter Bush Position]. 
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It also addresses the scientific community's divergent positions 
with respect to the causes of global warming and the extent to 
which it will result in long-term adverse environmental conse-
quences. Section III discusses the world community's develop-
ment of the Kyoto Protocol in response to global warming and 
the United States' opposition to its ratification. Current envi-
ronmental regulatory schemes and approaches by which the 
United States might domestically reduce and limit GHGs are 
also considered. Section IV examines the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of GHG reduction and limitation through 
existing environmental regulatory schemes. This section also 
considers the potential of a market based incentives approach 
to environmental regulation to effectively reduce and limit 
GHGs. Finally, Section V proposes a new regulatory program 
designed to reduce and limit domestic GHG emissions. The 
proposal's program development examines the various criteria 
necessary to establish an effective environmental regulatory 
program premised on market-based incentives. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. GLOBAL WARMING: WHAT IS IT? 
Over the past century, the Earth's surface temperature has 
increased roughly 1°F.2 The warmest ten years of the past cen-
tury have occurred within the last fifteen years.3 Unfortu-
nately, scientists estimate that this warming trend is just be-
ginning.4 
Scientists attribute global warming primarily to the re-
lease GHGs from anthropogenic, or human-induced, sources. 5 
2 OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. EPA, Pub. No. 6202J at 1 (2000). 
3 [d. 
• See, e.g., 147 CONGo REC. S2300-02 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001) !hereinafter S2300-
02) (statement by Sen. Kerry). Sen. Kerry stated "The chair of IPCC, Dr. Robert Wat-
son, put it his way: We see changes in climate, we believe we humans are involved, and 
we're projecting future climate changes more significant over the next 100 years than 
the last 100 years. And the IPCC report is only the latest in a body of science that 
demands action." [d. 
• 147 CONGo REC. S8894-02 (daily ed. Aug. 3 2001) !hereinafter S8894-02) (state-
ment by Sen. Lieberman explaining IPCC report summaries). See also NASA Defmi-
tions, available at http://asd-www.larc.nasa.gov/edulanthropodef.html (visited Novem-
ber 17, 2001) (explaining that anthropogenic is a word that scientists use to distinguish 
2
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Once emitted, GHGs. remain trapped in the earth's atmos-
phere. GHG molecules maintain the earth's habitable tem-
perature by absorbing infrared radiation, thereby insulating 
the earth from inhospitable temperatures found outside the 
earth's atmosphere.6 Without this GHG layer, the earth's sur-
face temperature would be almost 86°F cooler. 7 Such a tem-
perature would not support current life forms. Likewise, if too 
many GHGs enter the atmosphere, the earth's temperature 
will continually rise, eventually leading to environmental ca-
tastrophes.8 
As global surface temperatures continue to rise, snow-
covered lands are experiencing decreased snowfall and in-
creased ice 10ss.9 As a result, the earth's sea level is rising. 
Over the past century, scientists have charted a rise in sea 
level of up to eight inches.1° Research suggests that sea levels 
could rise as much as 35 feet over the next century.ll Coastal 
changes that people have introduced to the environment from processes that are natu-
ral). "An example of an anthropogenic source is an aerosol (very fme particles of dust 
or smoke suspended in the atmosphere). If a scientist described an aerosol that origi-
nates from an industrial emission point, it would be considered an anthropogenic aero-
sol. A non-anthropogenic aerosol would be one originating, say, from a dust storm, a 
volcanoe or natural burning"). Id. 
a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change 
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 1, available at http://www.unfccc. 
inUresource/iuckit/fact 01.html (last modified June 21,2001) !hereinafter Sheet 1). 
7 Id. See also supra note 2, at 2. 
8 See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming: 
Science FAQ - Fundamentals, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming 
Ifaq/fundamentals.html (last modified May 14, 2001) !hereinafter FAQl (explaining 
that some areas will receive more rain, while other areas will be drier. At the same 
time, extreme events like floods and droughts are likely to become more frequent. 
Warming will cause glaciers to melt and oceans to expand). See also 147 CONGo REC. 
S3936-01 (2001) !hereinafter S3936-011 (statement by Sen. Lieberman summarizing 
!PCC's Third Report on global warming). Sen. Lieberman stated that "According to 
these scientific experts, unless we find ways to stop global warming, ... a large rapid 
rise in temperature will profoundly affect the Earth's landscape in very real and conse-
quential terms ... Precipitation would become more erratic, leading to droughts that 
would make hunger an even more serious global problem than it is today. Diseases 
such as malaria and dengue fever would spread at an accelerated pace." Id. 
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change 
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 6, available at http://www.unfccc. 
inUresource/iuckitlfact 06.html (last modified June 21, 2001) !hereinafter Sheet 61. 
10 Id. See also United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming: 
Climate Change, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/climate/index.html# 
Air (last modified April 6, 2001). 
11 S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman explaining that such a rise 
in sea level could submerge millions of homes and coastal property under our present-
3
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cities would suffer immeasurable structural and economic 
losses from such a rise in sea level. 
Ice loss and global warming are interrelated. 12 Under 
normal circumstances, ice deflects approximately 80 percent of 
solar energy from the earth, whereas water absorbs solar en-
ergy,13 As surface temperatures rise, due in part to global 
warming, ice melts at a more rapid pace. With less ice to de-
flect solar energy, the rate at which global warming occurs also 
increases. Equally, as the ice available to deflect the solar en-
ergy decreases, the waters in turn absorb more heat. Scientists 
at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) confirm that the planet's waters are taking the 
brunt of the adverse affects of global warming.14 Moreover, 
while the oceans absorb heat, thereby keeping land tempera-
tures cooler, the absorption only delays the adverse impact of 
global warming on land. Due to the absorption of heat by bod-
ies of water, scientists project that only 50 percent of the 
anthropogenic effects from GHG emissions have been 
accounted for through increased land temperatures. 16 
Because the oceans are disproportionately absorbing the 
heat produced by increasing GHG emissions, the oceans are 
suffering dearly as a result. According to scientific evidence, 
increased water temperatures have already led to the destruc-
tion of nearly twenty-five percent of the planet's coral reefs.16 
Further, scientists project that within the next twenty years 
the remaining coral reefs could be dead,17 
Scientists estimate that the increasing GHG concentra-
tions in the atmosphere could raise global temperatures by as 
much as 5°F over the next 50 years.18 Scientists also predict 
that by the close of the next century, global temperatures could 
day oceans). 
12 82300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a Dec. 1999 article). 
13 Id. 
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a March 2000 NOAA release). 
" Id. 
16 Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry explaining the research results distributed at the 
International Coral Reef Symposium from Oct. 2000). 
17 Id. 
18 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change 
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 5, available at http://www.unfccc. 
intJresource/iuckitJfact 05.html (last modified June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Sheet 5]. 
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increase by as much as 10°F,19 If temperatures increase as 
predicted, more evaporation and precipitation will inevitably 
result. The predicted consequences in the United States alone 
include frequent, intense rainstorms; heat waves and droughts; 
and rises in coastal sea levels by as much as three feet.20 
Some GHGs occur naturally while humans create others 
through chemical processes. Naturally occurring GHGs in-
clude water vapor, carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), ni-
trous oxide (N20), and ozone (03).21 While natural GHGs origi-
nate from earth processes, they are also induced by human ac-
tivities. Human induced C02 results from burning solid waste, 
fossil fuel, and wood. Human induced CH4 results from the 
distribution of fossil fuel, the landfill processing of municipal 
solid waste, and livestock husbandry. Human induced N20 
results from solid waste and fossil fuel combustion and agricul-
tural activities. 
Four GHGs are the sole product of anthropogenic chemical 
processes: halogenated fluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocar-
bons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SFs).22 These manmade GHGs are a result of various indus-
trial processes, final products, by-products, and waste prod-
uctS.23 Whether the GHG source occurs naturally or is anthro-
pogenic in nature, all GHGs contribute to the planet's rising 
surface temperature. Unlike naturally occurring GHGs, how-
ever, anthropogenic GHGs can be controlled, reduced, and lim-
ited by human actions. 
B. GLOBAL WARMING: Is IT REALLY A PROBLEM? 
While scientists generally agree that global warming is oc-
curring, some hotly debate the causes of global warming, as 
well as its potential impacts on the planet. Specifically, United 
States scientists affiliated with industrial and governmental 
19 S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Liebermann explaining the results of 
the IPCC's Third Assessment Report on Global Warming). Sheet 5, supra note 18. 
20 FAQ, supra note 8. 
21 See supra note 2. 
22 Id. 
23 United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming: Emissions -
What are Greenhouse Gases, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/emissions 
/index.html (last modified May 14, 2001). 
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interests opposing more stringent environmental regulations 
have spurred this debate.24 As a result, well-known and highly 
regarded scientists throughout the world continue to provide 
differing opinions based on their scientific findings. 25 Yet, it is 
clear that the majority of scientists globally acknowledge ·that 
global warming is problematic, that it is worsening due to an-
thropogenic impacts, and that it is a condition that must be 
controlled to limit adverse environmental impacts.26 
1. Scientific Support 
The overwhelming majority of the scientific community be-
lieves that the research on global warming proves the global 
environment will suffer adversely in the long term. Such broad 
scientific and public awareness of the global warming issue is 
primarily a result of the United Nations' Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (FCCC) and the creation of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).27 
24 See generally, e.g., Sharon Beder, Climatic Confusion and Corporate Collusion: 
Hijacking the Greenhouse Debate, available at http://www.uow.edu.aularts/sts/sbeder/ 
ecologist2.html (visited Mar. 16, 2002) (discussing the corporate influence over Ameri-
can scientists in relationship to their position on global warming). The article was 
published in the March/April 1999 issue of The Ecologist. 
'" See Mike Ferullo, Climate Change: Senate Panel Considers Measure to Create 
National Research Strategy, 32 ER 1404 (2001) (Dr. Karl believes global warming is not 
a problem). See also 147 CONGo REC. S2659-02 (2001) [hereinafter S2659-021 (state-
ment by Mr. Peterson quoting a passage from Professor Morner, president of the Inter-
national Commission and sea level researcher). But see 147 CONGo REC. S6000-02 
(2001) [hereinafter S6000-021 (statement by Sen. Stevens). Dan Goldin, the Head of 
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration; Scott Gudes, the acting head of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Dr. Rita Colwell, the National 
Science Foundation Director; Charles Groat, Geological Survey Director; and experts 
from the International Arctic Research Center and the University of Alaska's Geo-
physical Institute noted that recent climate change activity likely stems from a number 
of factors, including natural variances and human activity. [d. Compare with supra 
note 12 (statement by Sen. Kerry). Dr. Robert Watson, chair of IPCC, believes humans 
are involved in global warming and projects that projects future climate changes will 
be more significant over the next 100 years than the last 100 years. [d. 
,. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - Third Report: Tech-
nical Summary, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm#sprep (visited Mar. 
16,2002). 
27 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Guide to the Cli-
mate Change Negotiation Process: The Climate Change Convention, available at 
http://www. unfccc.intiresource/ process/components/response/respconv.html (last modi-
fied June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Negotiation Process). The FCCC was adopted in 1992 
at the Rio Earth Summit to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
6
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The IPCC was established in 1988 and is composed of over 
2000 scientists from over 100 countries.28 The IPCC has re-
leased a number of reports citing strong evidence that the ma-
jor source of global warming over the last 50 years is anthropo-
genic in nature.29 The IPCC's third report on global warming, 
issued early in 2001 and authored by 700 expert scientists, 
concluded that unless the international community limits and 
reduces GHG emissions, the earth's average temperature will 
rise anywhere from 2°F to 10°F over the next century.3D Addi-
tionally, the IPCC projects that the climate changes over the 
next 100 years will be more significant than those of the past 
100 years.31 
In an attempt to refute the IPCC's third report, President 
George W. Bush requested and received a second opinion from 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).32 The NAS, however, 
confirmed the IPCC's findings, stating: 
The IPCC's conclusion that most of the observed warming of 
the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in 
greenhouse gas concentrations accurately reflects the current 
thinking of the scientific community on this issue ... Despite 
the uncertainties, there is general agreement that the ob-
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.ld. 
28 Id. The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization 
and the UN Environment Program. Id. It conducts rigorous surveys of the worldwide 
technical and scientific literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely 
recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. Id. 
The IPCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests from the Con-
vention's subsidiary bodies. Id. 
29 S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. McCain referencing an IPCC report). 
ao S3936-01, supra note 8 (statement by Sen. Liebermann explaining that according 
to the UN's IPCC Third Report on global warming authored by 700 scientists stated 
that the earth's temperature can be expected to rise up to lOA degrees Fahrenheit in 
the next 100 years). See also S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman). 
31 S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry paraphrasing Dr. Robert Wat-
son, Chair of the IPCC). 
32 S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman). See also National Acad-
emy of Science, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (2001), 
available at http://books.nap.edulbooksl03090757421htmi (visited Mar. 9, 2002) (refer-
ring to Appendix A - letter from the White House) !hereinafter Climate Change Sci-
ence). 
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served warming is real and particularly strong within the 
past twenty years. 33 
The most recent study conducted by NAS's National Re-
search Council stated that global warming is "undoubtedly 
real" and that over the past twenty years surface temperatures 
have risen at a rate substantially greater than the past 100-
year average.34 The NAS further advised the Bush Admini-
stration that current and future national policy decisions would 
influence the extent of damage suffered by human populations 
and ecosystems as the century progresses.35 
Around the same time that the FCCC authorized the crea-
tion of the IPCC, more than 2,000 United States scientists, in-
cluding Nobel Laureates, signed the Scientists' Statement on 
Global Disruption.36 This statement collectively acknowledges 
that GHG emissions will result in further global climate 
change, the adverse impacts of which will include ecological, 
economic, and social disruption. 37 Furthermore, the Amster-
dam Declaration, another statement signed by a group of scien-
tists regarding GHG emissions and global warming, was 
drafted in response to the growing concern over anthropogenic 
effects on the environment and ultimately on the human popu-
lation.38 
In addition to collective statements by large groups of rec-
ognized scientists acknowledging global warming as real and 
problematic, individual scientists have also come forward to 
33 88894-02, supra note 5 (statement by 8en. Lieberman). See also Climate Change 
Science, supra note 32 . 
.. 82300-02, supra note 4 (statement by 8en. Kerry). See also Climate Change 
Science, supra note 32. 
.. 147 CONGo REC. 86078-01(daily ed. June 12, 2001) [hereinafter 86078-01) (state-
ment by 8en. Kerry reading a crucial observation by the NAS). 
.. 143 CONGo REC. 810920-01 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter 810920-01) 
(statement by 8en. Wellstone). 
37 [d. 
38 See The Amsterdam Declaration, available at http://www.sciconf.igbp.kva.se/fr. 
html (last modified Oct. 26,2001). The declaration states "the scientific communities of 
four international global change research programs - the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Program (IGBP), the International Human Dimensions Program on Global 
Environmental Change (IHDP), the World Climate Research Program (WCRP) and the 
International Biodiversity Program DIVERSITAS - recognize that, in addition to the 
threat of significant climate change, there is growing concern over the ever-increasing 
human modification of other aspects of the global environment and the consequent 
implications for human well-being." [d. 
8
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publicly comment on global warming. At a recent Senate hear-
ing on the impact of global climate change in the arctic envi-
ronment, a number of national scientific leaders served as wit-
nesses.39 The majority of the witnesses attributed the recent 
climate change to a number of factors, but the two key factors 
cited by the witnesses were GHG emissions from anthropogenic 
sources and natural climate system variations.40 Dr. Thomas 
Karl, climatology director of NOAA, testified before the Senate 
regarding the scientific ability to distinguish between anthro-
pogenic GHGs and naturally occurring GHGS.41 According to 
Dr. Karl, C02 emissions have increased by twenty-five to thirty 
percent since the beginning of the industrial revolution and he 
attributes the increase almost entirely to human activity.42 
Scientists are also beginning to release results of their own 
studies on climate change further establishing the validity of 
global warming.43 For instance, scientists with the National 
Center for Scientific Research in Grenoble, France, retrieved a 
two-mile long ice core from the Antarctic Ice Sheet that showed 
the levels of GHGs are higher than they have been for the past 
420,000 years.44 Scientists at the University of Massachusetts 
studied annual growth rings in trees, as well as chemical evi-
dence contained in marine fossils, corals, and ancient ice, to 
track the Earth's surface temperature over the past 600 years. 
39 S6000-02, supra note 25 (statement by Sen. Stevens). Scientists who served as 
witnesses for the hearing included Dan Goldin, the Head of the National Aeronautic 
and Space Administration; Scott Gudes, the acting head of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration; Dr. Rita Colwell, National Science Foundation Director; 
Charles Groat, U.S. Geological Survey Director; and experts from the International 
Arctic Research Center and the University of Alaska's Geophysical Institute. Id. 
Many of the Witnesses noted that recent climate change activity likely stems from a 
number off actors, including natural variances and human activity. Id. 
40 Id. (statement by Sen. Stevens speaking of an Appropriations Committee Field 
Hearing in Fairbanks, Alaska on the impact of global climate change in the Arctic). 
.. See generally Mike Ferullo, Climate Change: Senate Panel Considers Measure to 
Create National Research Strategy, 32 ER 1404 (2001) . 
• 2 Id . 
.. See Environmental Law Reporter, Climate Change, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NO. 21. "A 
report prepared by Tom Wrigley, of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and 
Sarah Raper, of the University of East Anglia in the U.K., appearing in Science, con-
cludes that average global temperatures will rise between four and seven degrees 
Fahrenheit during this century, five times the elevation noticed during the last cen-
tury." Id. 
.. S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a June 1999 arti-
cle). 
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Their research indicated that the Twentieth Century has been 
the warmest century of the past six centuries. Specifically, 
three years during the 1990s proved to be the warmest of the 
600 years studied. 45 From the results of these studies, scien-
tists have concluded that global warming appears to be closely 
tied to anthropogenic GHG emissions rather than naturally-
occurring GHGS.46 
Scientists from the University of Maryland and the Na-
tional Aeronautic and Space Administration's Goddard Space 
Flight Center each ran models on ice sheets in the Arctic to 
assess their rate of melting. Currently, these ice sheets are 
melting at a rate of 14,000 square miles per year.47 The results 
from both models found less than a two percent chance that the 
melting is a result of normal climatic variations. Additionally, 
the models indicated less than a tenth of a percent chance that 
melting over the last 46 years was the result of normal varia-
tions.48 
2. Scientific Opposition 
Despite the widely held belief by most in the scientific 
community that GHG emissions induce global warming and 
cause adverse environmental effects, some reputable scientists 
take the position that reliable scientific data fails to suggest 
that GHG emissions facilitate global warming.49 Not surpris-
ingly, many of these same scientists have connections to indus-
try and governmental interests opposed to more stringent envi-
ronmental regulation. 50 
Dr. Patrick Michaels, climatologist and professor of envi-
ronmental science at the University of Virginia, believes most 
of this century's global warming occurred in the fIrst half of the 
century before there was a significant concentration of anthro-
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing an Apr. 1998 article where 1990, 1995 
and 1997 were found to be the warmest years in the last 600). 
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing an Apr. 1998 article). 
" Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a Dec. 1999 article). 
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a Dec. 1999 article). 
•• S2659-02, supra note 25 (statement by Rep. Peterson explaining that Dr. Sally 
Baliunas of Harvard, Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, for example, agrees that 
global warming science is in many cases exaggerated, flawed and unsettled). 
'" See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
10
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pogenic GHG emissions. 51 In keeping with Dr. Michaels, some 
scientists estimate that nearly half of the climate warming 
trends and changes that have occurred since 1850 are the re-
sult of natural variances such as the sun.52 Studies of the cli-
mate over the past 120 years by Harvard-Smithsonian Center 
scientists indicate that the sun is responsible for up to 71 per-
cent of the changes in earth's temperature.53 
Moreover, some scientists even believe the GHG C02 is not 
worth monitoring, reducing or limiting. Dr. March, a re-
searcher at the Argonne National Laboratory, stated that 
Carbon dioxide is a minor greenhouse gas that contributes 
only about three percent of the greenhouse effect, and man-
made sources represent some three percent to four percent of 
carbon dioxide emissions, the rest being from natural sources. 
[l]f all the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were to vanish 
magically, it would lead to a one degree centigrade decrease 
in global temperatures. 54 
Some scientists think that reliable scientific data fails to 
suggest that global warming will result in adverse environ-
mental effects. For instance, Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of 
Meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology testi-
fied before the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee that research has failed to establish that global 
warming is a significant problem.55 Dr. Michaels testified that 
conditions in the real world simply have not matched changes 
projected by some global warming computer models.56 Even 
6' See generally 143 CONGo REc. S10308-01 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1997) [hereinafter 
S10308-01) (statement by Sen. Hagel). See also supra note 24. Dr. Michaels edits the 
World Climate Report, which receives funding from Western Fuels Association (coal 
interest companies). [d. 
62 [d. (statement by Sen. Hagel). One scientist, Judith Lean, stated "We figure that 
half the climate change 'from 1850 to now can be accounted for by the Sun." [d. Ms. 
Lean works for the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington. [d. 
63 [d. 
54 See generally 146 CONGo REC. S5291-01 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) [hereinafter 
S5291-01) (statement by Sen. Hagel). Dr. March works for Argonne National Labora-
tory, a Department of Energy Laboratory operated by the University of Chicago. Ar-
gonne National Laboratory Home Page, at http://www.anl.gov (visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
56 S10308-01, supra note 51 (statement by Sen. Hagel). See also supra note 24. Dr. 
Lindzen is reported to have received $2,500 a day for his services as an in independent 
scientist-consultant for the fossil fuel industry. [d. 
56 [d. 
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the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") challenged a 
recent report on climate change impacts on the United States.57 
Critical of the attempts by scientists to provide an accurate 
prediction of climate change in the United States over the com-
ing 100 years, the EPA contends that: 
Virtually all published estimates of how climate could change 
in the United States are the result of computer models ... 
These complicated models ... are still not accurate enough to 
provide reliable forecasts on how the climate may change; and 
the several models often yield contradictory results ... Scien-
tists are unable to say whether particular regions will receive 
more or less rainfall; and for many regions they are unable to 
even state whether a wetter or drier climate is more likely.58 
In the eyes of some reputable, but industrially and politi-
cally affiliated American scientists, the debate as to the causes 
and impacts of global warming is far from settled. The publica-
tion of new studies and opinions supporting both positions con-
tinue. Despite the divergent opinions concerning global warm-
ing, much of the international community has chosen to take a 
proactive approach. Convinced by the overwhelming scientific 
support suggesting that global warming will inevitably lead to 
globally adverse environmental impacts, the international 
community chose to initiate a global solution to a global prob-
lem. The global solution was the creation of the Kyoto Protocol 
to reduce and limit global GHG emissions. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING: KyOTO 
PROTOCOL 
On December 10, 1997, over 180 parties to the United Na-
tions FCCC met in Kyoto, Japan for the third Conference of the 
Parties (COP-3).59 During COP-3, the parties established the 
., S5291-01, supra note 54 (statement by Sen. Hagel) . 
.. Id. The Whitman Administration made this comment. Id. President George W. 
Bush appointed Christine Whitman Administrator of the EPA. See U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency: Office of the Administrator, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
adminweb/about.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2002). 
.. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Guide to Climate 
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international amendment to the FCCC known as the Kyoto 
Protocol. 60 As of June 4, 2002, 84 parties have signed the 
Kyoto Protocol. 61 Forty-two parties have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol while an additional 32 parties have either acceded to, 
approved or accepted the Kyoto Protocol.62 
The Kyoto Protocol, a continually evolving piece of interna-
tionallaw, establishes and refines international guidelines for 
the reduction and limitation of GHG emissions. The primary 
focus of the Kyoto Protocol is stabilization of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the global climate.63 The GHGs regu-
lated under the Kyoto Protocol originate from industrial 
sources, such as fuel combustion, energy, transportation, 
manufacturing, construction, mining, chemical, agriculture, 
and waste management. The regulated GHGs include carbon 
dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluoro-
carbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6). 
The Kyoto Protocol provides four primary mechanisms to 
address GHG emission reduction and limitation. Currently, 
the mechanisms focus on Annex 1 parties, specifically those 
industrialized countries that have historically contributed to 
Change Negotiation Process: IPCC, available at http://www.unfccc.intJresource/process 
IcomponentS/institution lipcc.html (last modified Nov. 08, 2001). The FCCC text was 
adopted at the UN Headquarters in NY in May of 1992. Id. The FCCC was initiated 
in March 1994. Id. See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Glossary, available at http://www.unfccc.de/siteinfo Iglossary.html (last modi-
fied June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Glossary]. The COP is the supreme body of the Con-
vention. It currently meets once a year to review the Convention's progress. Id. The 
word "conference" connotes an "association." Id. 
00 Id. The glossary explains that a protocol is linked to an existing convention, but it 
is a separate and additional agreement that must be signed and ratified by the Parties 
to the convention. Id . 
• , Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
3d Sess., [1997] U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1I1997 reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 32 
(1998) [hereinafter Kyoto). See also Glossary, supra note 59 (explaining that parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol are not limited strictly to countries). When a regional economic 
integration organization becomes a party without the states of the organization being 
parties, the organization is still bound to the obligations of the protocol. Id. Where the 
states of the organization are also parties to the Protocol, then the states and the or-
ganization will decide the responsibilities of each to meet the obligations of the Proto-
col. Id. See also Section VII: Appendix. 
62 Id. 
63 Kyoto, supra note 61. 
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GHG emissions.64 Annex 1 parties also include those countries 
with economies in transit, whereas non-Annex 1 parties are 
comprised primarily of developing countries. 
While the four mechanisms suggest GHG reduction and 
limitation methods for non-Annex 1 parties, enumerated reduc-
tion commitments have not been established for non-Annex 1 
parties. Annex 1 parties, however, must comply with enumer-
ated reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protoco1.65 An-
nex 1 parties are responsible for ensuring their respective ag-
gregate anthropogenic C02 equivalent GHG emissions do not 
exceed a calculated limit.66 GHG emissions must be reduced, 
overall, by five percent below 1990 levels between the years of 
2008 and 2012.67 The calculated limitations of the GHGs were 
determined by taking into account the individual and aggre-
gate Annex 1 party GHG emissions of 1990.68 
Annex 1 parties may utilize the four mechanisms to 
achieve compliance with Kyoto's enumerated requirements. 
First, joint fulfillment allows an Annex 1 party to offset its 
enumerated GHG emissions reduction and limitation obliga-
tions by working with a non-Annex 1 party.69 Second, emission 
reduction units (ERUs) allow parties to transfer and acquire 
emission reduction units from each other.70 Parties who trans-
fer ERUs lose their ability to emit GHGs for the quantity of 
units transferred. Parties acquiring ERUs may emit GHGs up 
.. Glossary, supra note 59. Annex 1 parties include industrialized countries who 
have historically contributed to global climate change as well as countries with 
"economies in transition" (known as EITs). [d. Annex I parties consist of the 24 origi-
nal Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) members, the European Union, 
and 14 countries with economies in transition. [d. The OECD consists of Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Japan, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the UK, and the US. [d. 
55 Kyoto, supra note 6l. 
.. [d. • 
67 [d. 
.. [d. 
69 [d. 
7. [d. Achieving the required emissions limitations and reduction commitments 
included ensuring that the calculated emission limits are not exceeded, that the emis-
sions are reduced to a level 5 percent below that of the base year between the years of 
2008 and 2012 and that post 2012 emission limitations and reductions are met. [d. 
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to the quantity of units they have purchased from the transfer-
ring party. 
The third mechanism, separately identified yet related to 
ERUs, is emission trading.71 If a party wishes to use emission 
. trading to achieve its enumerated reduction commitment, the 
trading must be in addition to domestic efforts already under-
way to achieve compliance with enumerated commitments.72 
The clean development mechanism (CDM) is the fourth 
mechanism by which non-Annex 1 and Annex 1 parties can 
achieve the quantified emission limitations and reductions. 73 
Under the CDM, non-Annex 1 parties benefit from approved 
ERU programs by reducing their own GHG emissions before 
mandatory reductions have been announced.74 In addition, the 
CDM helps non-Annex 1 parties achieve sustainable develop-
ment while assisting with the FCCC's ultimate goal: reducing 
GHGS.75 An Annex 1 party that creates CDM programs result-
ing in actual reductions may use those reductions to meet its 
quantified emission reduction and limitation commitments un-
der Article III of the Protocol. 76 
In addition to the aforementioned mechanisms to achieve 
the quantified emission reductions and limitations, Annex 1 
parties may also rely on sinks. 77 A sink is place where carbon 
accumulates without increasing the levels of existing C02 in 
the atmosphere.78 For Annex 1 parties to meet their reduction 
71 [d. Article XVII addresses the principles, modes, rules and guidelines for emis-
sion trading. The aspect of emission trading that is of concern is reporting and ac-
countability. [d. According to Article XVII, parties at a COP should define the emis-
sion trading reporting and accountability principles, modes, rules and guidelines. [d. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. The clean development mechanism can also be used to arrange funding for 
certified emission reduction unit project activities. [d. Part of the funding for various 
projects will be used for administrative expenses. [d. 
7. [d. 
7. [d. In order for the emission reductions to be used towards reaching compliance 
with the quantified emission reduction and limitation commitments, the reductions 
must occur no earlier than January 1, 2000. [d. The reductions accrued will go to-
wards compliance during the 2008 through 2012 compliance commitment period. [d. 
7. [d. Certification is based on the voluntary participation of the parties, the real, 
measurable, long-term benefits from the reduction and the reductions are a result of 
more than what would occur if the reduction program did not exist. [d. 
77 [d. While the overall reduction of GHG emissions is not expected until at least 
2008, Annex 1 parties are expected to make demonstrable progress towards achieving 
the overall reduction goal by the year 2005. [d. 
7. See Exploring the Environment: Global Climate Change - Glossary, available at 
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commitments, they may use sinks resulting from post-1990 
human induced land use change, afforestation, deforestation, 
and reforestation activities.79 
The Kyoto Protocol will enter into force after two separate, 
but connected, conditions occur. First, at least 55 parties to the 
FCCC must sign and ratify or accede to, accept or approve of 
the Kyoto ProtocoPO Those 55 or more parties must account 
for no less than 55 percent of the total reported 1990 carbon 
dioxide emissions. 81 Once both conditions have been satisfied, 
the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force 90 days later.82 Mter 
the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, any additional parties in-
terested in joining must do so by becoming a party and acced-
ing to, accepting or approving of the Kyoto Protocol. Upon the 
party's accession, acceptance or approval, the Kyoto Protocol 
will not go into effect for that party for 90 days.83 
For nearly five years, the United States was an active par-
ticipant in the development of the Kyoto Protocol. The Clinton 
Administration was determined to establish the United States 
as a conscientious player in global environmental policy.84 Al-
though the United States was an original signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol under the Clinton administration, Congress has 
taken considerable steps in the last four years to ensure that 
the United States does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol as writ-
ten.85 
http://www.cotf.edulete/modules/climate/GCglossary.html (last modified Feb. 13,2001). 
79 Kyoto, supra note 61. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
S< United States Department of State - International Information Programs, Fact 
Sheet: President Clinton and Vice President Gore Environmental Leadership on the 30th 
Anniversary of Earth Day, available at http://usinfo.stategov/topicallgloballenviron 
/latest00042204.htm (visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
so See S. Res. 98, 105th Congo (1997) (enacted) [hereinafter S. Res. 98]. See also 
Pamela Najor, Climate Change: GOP Lawmaker Sees Need to Revamp Kyoto Pact to 
Remove Reduction Mandates, 236 DEN a-5, 2000 [hereinafter Reduction Mandates]. 
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B. UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE KyOTO PROTOCOL: 
"FATALLY FLAWED" 
Criticism of the Kyoto Protocol stems from two primary 
concerns: (1) the lack of binding reduction and limitation com-
mitments on developing countries during the first compliance 
period and (2) the perceived potential for adverse economic im-
pact on Kyoto-compliant industrialized countries. 86 Fearing 
that the Clinton Administration would ratify of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol without binding participation on the part of developing 
nations, Congress passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in 1997, 
which stated the: 
United States should not be a signatory to any protocol . . . 
which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce 
GHGs for the Annex 1 parties, unless the protocol or other 
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commit-
ments to limit or reduce GHGs for developing country parties 
within the same compliance period or which would result in 
serious harm to the economy of the United States.87 
The Byrd-Hagel resolution passed unanimously (95-0), 
demonstrating broad bipartisan agreement that the United 
States should not implement the Kyoto Protocol as written.88 
Congressional concern over the adverse impacts on the United 
States' economy and disparity of treatment between developing 
and industrialized countries has not waned over the last four 
years. 
To further secure its position, in 1998, Congress mandated 
that no 1999 EPA-appropriated funding be used to "propose or 
issue rules, regulations, decrees or orders for the purpose of 
implementation or in preparation for implementation of the 
86 Bush Position, supra note 1. "The report summarizes the initial positions of the 
Bush Administration on climate change after three months of an ongoing Cabinet-level 
review. It includes an overview of the current US actions to address climate change, an 
analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, a discussion about advancing the science of climate 
change and the technology to address it, and a plan for promoting cooperation in the 
Western Hemisphere and the world." [d. Cf Philip Gwage, Equity and Global Cli-
mate Change: An LDC Perspective, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/eventsl 
conCpresentationslgwage.doc (visited Mar. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Equity) (explaining 
the principle of equity as it relates to Kyoto compliance requirements). 
87 S. Res. 98, supra note 85. 
86 [d. 
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Kyoto Protocol."89 The 2000 and 2001 EPA budgets contained 
the same limitation.90 Due to the specificity of its restrictions 
on the EPA's use of funding, Congress has effectively precluded 
the EPA's ability to establish any meaningful guidelines to ad-
dress global warming if those guidelines remotely resemble 
those of the Kyoto Protocol. 91 
The shift from the Clinton administration to the Bush Ad-
ministration has strengthened the United States' vocal opposi-
tion to the Kyoto Protocol. 92 According to President Bush, the 
"Kyoto Protocol is fatally flawed in fundamental ways."93 De-
spite the onerous negotiating process involved in establishing 
the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush stated that the targets and 
timetables for the long-term goals "were arrived at arbitrarily 
and were not related to any specific scientific information or 
long-term objective."94 Accordingly, President Bush's view on 
the Kyoto Protocol is in keeping with that of other members of 
his Administration. 
A recent report issued by the Bush Administration cabinet, 
at the request of President Bush, stated that the Kyoto Protocol 
fails to establish long-term goals based on science, poses seri-
ous and unnecessary risks to the United States and world 
economies, and is ineffective in addressing climate change be-
cause it excludes major parts of the world.95 EPA Administra-
tor Christine Todd Whitman stated "The Kyoto Protocol is un-
fair to the United States and to other industrialized nations 
because it exempts 80 percent of the world from compliance."96 
In addition to its fear that the Kyoto Protocol is unfair and 
lacking in scientific support, the Bush Administration has de-
clared that the costs implicated in complying with the Kyoto 
Protocol's GHG emission reduction and limitation commit-
ments could be quite substantial.97 The Bush Administration 
.. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 769, 105th Congo (1998). 
00 Reduction Mandates, supra note 85. 
9. See, e.g., Michael J. O'Grady, Going Nowhere Fast: The Environmental Record of 
the l05th Congress, 29 ENVfL. L. REP. 10085 (1999). 
.. Bush Position, supra note 1. 
93 [d. 
.. [d. 
IN! [d. 
96 [d. Cf Equity, supra note 86. 
97 Bush Position, supra note 1. 
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has compared compliance with the Kyoto Protocol with that of 
the impacts of the 1970's oil crisis: potential transformation of 
the United States economy from "one of strong growth to reces-
sion, with potentially significant repercussions for the global 
economy."98 
Supporters of President Bush's stance on the Kyoto Proto-
col have applauded his "go-slow" approach and have further 
commended him for asserting that the Kyoto Protocol is "fatally 
flawed."99 However, even those in agreement with the Presi-
dent's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol are supportive of 
some type of domestic program to address global climate 
change issues. As Senator Lieberman pointed out during a 
July 17, 2001 press statement: "Despite President Bush's un-
willingness to be a leader, there is growing support from both 
parties who want America to be a part of the world community 
in addressing the crisis of climate."lOO 
Agreeing that the United States should not ignore increas-
ing domestic GHG emissions, other senators also advocate the 
United States' involvement in a program to reduce and limit 
GHG emissions. For instance, Senator Jeffords, the head of the 
Senate Environment Committee, is urging the Bush Admini-
stration to reduce global warming linked to C02 emissions in 
the wake of the Administration's refusal to ratify the Kyoto 
ProtocoPOl Jeffords has proposed new legislation that would 
require GHG emission reductions from power plants. 102 Sena-
tor McCain and Senator Kerry proposed legislation that would 
speed technology investments for the curtailment of GHG 
emissions. 103 Senator Stevens has proposed legislation to in-
98 Id. 
99 See, e.g., Jon E. Hilsenrath, Environmental Assessment Favor Slow Approach, 
THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2001, at M8. . 
100 Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News UPDATE: Lieber-
man Says Bush Made US Climate "Renegade" by Patrick Connole (July 18, 2001), 
available at http://www.planetark.org/avantgol!lailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11620 (vis-
ited Jan. 2, 2002). 
101 Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: Ex-Republican 
Senator Aims at Power Plant Emissions (July 17, 2001), available at http://www.planet 
ark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11634 (visited Jan. 2, 2002). 
lIrl Id. 
103 Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: Senator McCain 
Urges Bush to Act Now on Climate Change by Patrick Connole (July 11, 2001), avail-
able at http//:www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11507 (visited 
Jan. 2, 2002). 
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crease GHG emission reduction and limitation research and 
development.104 Even Senator Byrd, the coauthor of the Byrd-
Hagel resolution, gives credence to the proposition that the 
United States should curb its GHG emissions.105 Senator Byrd 
is co-sponsoring a climate bill to provide almost five billion dol-
lars for research and development toward GHG emission re-
duction and limitation. lo6 
While the current administration refuses to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol as written, it is not the only mechanism by 
which to reduce and limit domestic GHG emissions. In many 
ways, the United States has been a pioneer in the field of envi-
ronmental regulation. Therefore, current environmental regu-
latory programs may be used to regulate GHG emissions or 
may be used to provide guidance in developing a new and more 
appropriate mechanism to address GHG emission limitations 
and reductions. 
C. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO GWBAL WARMING 
In proposing a domestic response to combat global warm-
ing, the Kyoto Protocol is helpful in determining which GHG 
emissions require reguiation within the United States. All six 
of the anthropogenic C02 equivalent GHGs identified in the 
Kyoto Protocol are present in the United States and, therefore, 
require regulation. If the United States plans to regulate GHG 
emissions though an existing regulatory mechanism, it could 
potentially rely on one program found within the EPA's Clean 
Air Act (CAA).107 Additionally, two environmental regulatory 
schemes that rely on market-based incentives, EPA's Title IV 
Acid Rain Program and California's RECLAIM Program, can 
serve as a template for the creation of the new GHG regulatory 
scheme. This section outlines those programs. 
104 Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News UPDATE: Senate 
Panel Weighs New Climate Change Bill by Patrick Connole (July 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=1l645 (visited Jan. 2, 
2002). 
"lO [d. 
106 [d. 
107 Clean Air Act, Title I, §101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1990) The EPA's authority 
to regulate the emissions of various constituents originates from the Clean Air Act. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/9
2002] DOMESTIC GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 713 
It is important to keep in mind, however, the current ban 
on EPA-appropriated funding for programs that resemble the 
Kyoto Protoco1. 108 In order for the EPA to implement a pro-
gram aimed at reducing and limiting GHG emissions, as out-
lined in the Kyoto Protocol, Congress will have to lift the fund-
ing ban. Nonetheless, by its very nature, a domestic program 
would not encompass the provisions in the Kyoto Protocol that 
Congress found problematic in 1997 when it adopted the Byrd-
Hagel Resolution. In addition, many of the same Senators that 
objected to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol now support 
instituting a program to address global warming. 109 Therefore, 
the growing political support for domestic GHG regulation will 
help facilitate the creation and implementation of a domestic 
GHG emission reduction and limitation program. 
1. Current Federal Program: National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards 
As of 2002, at least one program outlined under the CAA 
may potentially serve as a successful regulatory scheme for 
addressing domestic GHG emission reductions and limitations. 
This program is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) under §108 and §109 of the CAA.l1O NAAQS estab-
lishes outdoor air quality standards. 111 
Section 108 of the CAA, Air Quality Criteria and Control 
Techniques, is the air pollutant identification portion of 
NAAQS. Section 302 of the Act dermes an air pollutant as any 
air pollutant agent or combination of agents emitted into or 
that otherwise enter the ambient air.112 Under §108, the EPA 
is authorized to revise the list of air pollutants established un-
der NAAQS and may add newly identified air pollutants.113 
Newly identified air pollutants have two levels of control: pri-
mary standards for promoting the protection of public health 
1'" See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
110 Clean Air Act, Title I, §§108-109, 42 U.S.C. §§7408-7409 (1990). 
111 EPA Terms of the Environment (last modified July 6, 1998) available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/studentslterms_oCenvironment.htm. 
112 Clean Air Act, Title I, §302, 42 U.S.C. §7602 (1990). 
113 Clean Air Act, Title I, §108, 42 U.S.C. §7408 (1990). 
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and secondary standards for promoting the protection of public 
welfare. 114 
Any constituent that the EPA adds to the list of air pollut-
ants for control under NAAQS through §108 and §109 is ana-
lyzed using two factors.115 First, the EPA must make a judg-
ment as to whether the constituent has the potential to rea-
sonably endanger the public health or welfare. 116 Second, the 
EPA must consider the constituent's numerous and diverse 
mobile and stationary sources.ll7 
Since GHGs are agents emitted into the ambient air, 
GHGs are likely to fit the definition of an air pollutant under 
§302 of the CAA.118 As such, each of the six GHGs may be in-
cluded as an air pollutant under NAAQS, assuming it meets 
the aforementioned factors mandated for the addition of a con-
stituent as a new pollutant. For instance, under an EPA re-
view of CH4, the EPA would assess the potential for CH4 to 
reasonably endanger the public health or welfare. The EPA 
would also need to consider the numerous and diverse mobile 
and stationary sources of CH4 before identifying it as an air 
pollutant for regulation under NAAQS. 
The pivotal inquiry in assessing whether a constituent can 
be regulated under NAAQS hinges on the constituent's poten-
tial to reasonably endanger public health or welfare. How to 
make that assessment, however, is not readily clear from the 
statutory language. Holding that the determination as to 
whether a constituent "reasonably endangers" the public 
should be made by the regulating agency, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court explained that: 
114 Clean Air Act, Title I, §109, 42 U.S.C. §7409 (1990). 
11. See supra note 113. See also supra note 114. 
116 See supra note 113. 
117 Id. See also supra note 112. "Effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, 
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, 
weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards 
to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and 
well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with other 
air pollutants." Id. 
116 Ambient air is defmed by a two-prong test: whether the location of the air is 
external to buildings and whether the air is accessible to the general public. Clarifica-
tion Letter from EPA for Ambient Air Definition, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ 
nsr/gen/memo-x.html (visited Mar. 16, 2002). 
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Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence diffi-
cult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to 
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert 
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof 
of cause and effect. The Administrator may apply his exper-
tise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely 
substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends 
among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, 
from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as "fact," 
and the like.1l9 
American Trucking Ass'n. Inc. u. U.S.E.P.A followed this 
reasoning. 120 The court held that EPA's decision to adopt and 
set air quality standards need only be based on "reasonable 
extrapolations from some reliable evidence."121 In so holding, 
the court noted that §108(a)(1)(A) of the CAA requires no proof 
of causation; the Administrator may deem emissions "air pol-
lutants" when they "in his judgment, cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare."122 Therefore, courts will uphold the 
EPA's decision to add a new constituent for NAAQS regulation 
so long as its addition relies on reasonable extrapolations from 
some reliable evidence. 
2. Current Federal and State Programs: A Template for Regu-
lating GHG Emissions 
While NAAQS has the potential to regulate GHGs as air 
pollutants, other approaches may be more appropriate. For 
example, the EPA initially relied on NAAQS to regulate nitrous 
oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx) emissions from Midwest 
power plants, the major culprits contributing to acid rain in the 
Northeast. NAAQS, however, soon proved to be unsuccessful 
in adequately regulating the power industry's NOx and SOx 
119 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432, 256 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 
332 (D.C. Cir. 1986) citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.) (footnotes 
omitted), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S. Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976). 
00 175 F.3d 1027, 1055 U.S. App. D.C. 16,45 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
121 [d. Citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432, 256 U.S. App. 
D.C. 310, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
122 [d. 
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emissions. 123 As a result, Congress promulgated a new pro-
gram under the CAA that authorized EPA to implement and 
enforce a more aggressive approach to NOx and SOx emission 
reduction and limitation.124 This program, known as the Acid 
Rain Program, under Title IV of the CAA, is a regulatory 
scheme relying on market-based incentives. 
With respect to GHGs, the United States should also re-
view current environmental regulatory programs in order to 
develop a new program that most effectively addresses global 
warming. In light of the industry-backed political forces that 
tend to favor scant environmental regulation, a market-based 
incentives program may well· be easier to pass through Con-
gress than a control and command approach to reducing GHGs. 
Two programs merit review as potential templates for de-
veloping a new GHG regulatory scheme: EPA's CAA Title IV 
program and California's South Coast Air Quality Management 
District's (SCAQMD) Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
(RECLAIM) program. As discussed above, the Acid Rain Pro-
gram is a market-based incentives regulatory approach to con-
trolling power plant NOx and SOx emissions.125 Likewise, 
RECLAIM was developed to address NOx and SOx emissions 
in the Los Angeles air basin.126 A new regulatory program to 
most effectively address domestic GHGs contributing to global 
warming will, in part, be based on analyses of current pro-
grams' weaknesses and strengths. 
a. EPA's Acid Rain Program: Title IV of the CAA 
The Acid Rain program under Title IV of the CAA, promul-
gated in 1990, regulates power generation NOx and SOx emis-
sions through a market-based incentives approach.127 Imple-
123 Byron Swift, How Environmental Law Works: An analysis of the Utility Sector's 
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide under The Clean Air Act, 
14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 314 (2001). 
,.. Clean Air Act, Title IV, §401, 42 U.S.C. §7651 (2001). 
125 THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, U.S. EPA, Pub. No. EPA-400-
K-93-001 (1993) !hereinafter Plain English Guide]. 
126 See generally South Coast Air Quality Management District Website, at 
http://www.aqmd.gov (last modified Dec. 27, 2001). See also South Coast Air Quality 
Management District RECLAIM Rules, available at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/ 
tofc20.html (last modified May 30, 2001). 
127 Supra note 124. 
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mentation of Title IV occurs through an integrated set of rules 
and guidelines established to meet three objectives.l28 The fIrst 
objective is achieving environmental benefits through SOx and 
NOx emission reductions. l29 The second objective is energy 
efficient pollution prevention and facilitating active trading of 
allowances. l3o The last objective is the use of other compliance 
options to minimize compliance costs, maximize economic effi-
ciency, and permit strong economic growth.l31 
Title IV focuses on two divergent regulatory schemes to re-
duce NOx and SOx emissions from utility sources: (1) a rate-
based standard for NOx and (2) a cap-and-trade approach for 
SOX. l32 With regard to the SOx cap-and-trade approach, the 
EPA determined the baseline allowance allocations for the 
utilities according to their average emissions between 1985 and 
1987,133 Allowances are issued annually and entitle the holder 
to emit a certain number of tons of SOx. Each year, the emis-
sion source retires from its bank of emission allowances the 
number of tons of SOx emitted during that year. l34 Each suc-
cessive year, allowances are issued in smaller quantities to 
emission sources, according to a fixed statutory schedule, to 
ensure Title IV's targeted SOx reductions of 50 percent. l35 
When an emission source exceeds its annual allowance, it re-
ceives a $2,000 fine for each exceeded ton of emissions and is 
forced to offset the violation the following year,136 
128 Plain English Guide, supra note 125. 
129 [d. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
m See generally Byron Swift, Command and Control: Why Cap and Trade Should 
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330 (2001). See 
also Clean Air Act, Title IV, §403, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2001). See also Clean Air Act, 
Title IV, §407, 42 U.S.C. § 7651£(2001). 
... Clean Air Act, Title IV, §404, 42 U.S.C. §7651c (2001). The EPA may authorize, 
under certain circumstances, adjustments to the baseline allowance allocations. Id. 
"" Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Designing an 
International Greenhouse Gas Emissions trading System, 15 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 160, 
161 (Winter, 2001). 
134 See supra note 133. 
136 Clean Air Act, Title IV, §412, 42 U.S.C. §7651k (2001). An offset is where a 
source must reduce current emissions to make room for new emissions. Id. An Exam-
ple would be a facility that wants to emit an additional ten tons, it would be required to 
reduce its existing emissions by twenty tons making a overall reduction of ten tons of 
emissions. 
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To facilitate the SOx cap-and-trade program, two phases of 
the cap-and-trade regulatory scheme were established. The 
Phase I required the 263 dirtiest coal-fired generating units to 
reduce SOx emissions to 5.7 million tons.137 Phase II, imple-
mented in 2000, includes the 263 Phase I coal-fIred generating 
units and all other generating units larger than twenty-fIve 
megawatts. 13S The overall SOx emission cap for Phase II is 
8.95 million tons. 139 
The trading aspect of Title IV is handled by the Chicago 
Board of Trade Futures Market; the tracking of the allowance 
trading is handled by the Continuous Emissions Monitoring 
System.140 The EPA records permit purchases through an Al-
lowance Tracking System.14l The purchases of emission allow-
ances from other emission sources are made by private transac-
tions through annual EPA sponsored auctions,142 As of June 
1997, nearly 2,700 trades had occurred involving 42.4 million 
allowances. 143 
Title IV does not dictate the means by which a particular 
emission source is to satisfy its emissions requirements.144 The 
emission source may rely on any of a number of strategies, 
such as innovating new technology, switching to low-sulfur 
coal, or shutting down a production unit. 145 For example, some 
emission sources are developing new technologies to improve 
effIciency. Regulated sources have generated scrubber innova-
tions and initiated research on fuel blending.146 Within a year 
of the program's 1995 commencement, emissions were almost 
40 percent below the reduction schedule target. 147 Contempo-
raneously, total domestic electricity generation actually in-
creased by over two and a half percent.14S Control costs for the 
'37 See supra note 133. 
'38 Clean Air Act, Title lV, §405, 42 U.S.C. §765ld (2001). 
139 [d. 
140 See supra note 134. 
'<I See supra note 136. 
142 [d. 
'43 See supra note 134. 
'44 See supra note 124. 
'" Clean Air Act, Title lV, §408, 42 U.S.C. §7651g (2001). 
146 Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Note, Warming up to an International Greenhouse Gas 
Market: Lessons from the US Acid Rain Program, 20 STAN. ENVfL. L.J. 221, 238 (2001). 
147 Plain English Guide, supra note 125. 
148 See supra note 146. 
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Title IV regulatory scheme were nearly 50 percent less than 
those of the command and control regulatory alternative.149 
The pollution reductions accomplished under Title IV account 
for over 50 percent of the total pollution reductions of the last 
ten years. 150 Remarkably, the Title IV program is administered 
by an EPA staff ofless than 100 nationwide.151 
b. The South Coast Air Quality District's Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market Program 
In keeping with EPA's Title IV Acid Rain program, Cali-
fornia adopted a market-based incentives program to control 
NOx and SOx emissions. In 1991, SCAQMD introduced a 
marketable permit system to help regulate the 12,000 square 
mile Los Angeles air basin. 152 SCAQMD created and imple-
mented RECLAIM in 1993 to specifically address increasing 
NOx and SOx emissions. 153 RECLAIM is based on the tradable 
permit approach.154 RECLAIM, however, differs from the tra-
ditional cap-and-trade program in that regulated sources have 
differing "caps" for emitting the same pollutants. 
Under RECLAIM, there is no explicit cap on emissions; 
rather there are overall mandated emissions reductions. 155 
These emissions reductions vary depending on the emission 
source and are measured against a baseline emissions level. 
Emission rights allocated to the regulated emission sources 
were based on the existing emissions at the time RECLAIM 
was adopted. RECLAIM further established phased reductions 
of emission allowances for the period of 1994 to 2003.156 The 
regulated emission sources receive declining emission alloca-
tions as the years progress towards 2003.157 Currently. over 
14. See supra note 134 . 
..., [d. 
I'I See supra note 146. 
162 See South Coast Air Quality Management District Rules 2000-2015 (1993), avail-
able at http://www.aqmd.gov/ruleslhtml/tofc20.html.(last modified May 30, 2001). 
163 [d. 
"" See supra note 126. 
1M See supra note 154. 
1M [d. 
m See supra note 152. 
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500 industries are regulated by RECLAIM in an area that has 
fourteen million residents. 158 
D. MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES: THEORY 
Since GHGs will arguably be most effectively regulated 
under a market-based incentives program, it is important to 
address the theories behind this approach to environmental 
regulation. As one industrialist put it "all pollution and all 
waste is lost profit."159 In other words, the more efficient the 
production process is, the fewer emissions result. 160 As a 
means to integrating efficient production with environmental 
regulation, experts began supporting a market-based incen-
tives approach to environmental regulation. 161 By the 1970's 
regulators began looking at various market-based incentives 
approaches for establishing environmental regulations, though 
they were still not as popular or accepted as the traditional 
command and control approaches.l62 
In 1988, market-based incentives finally received signifi-
cant attention, specifically with regard to air pollution and 
emission reductions and limitations. Although there is still 
disagreement as to the effectiveness of this approach, acade-
mia, government, private industry, and the environmental 
community began to explore market-based incentives as an 
'08 CorpWatch, Trading Places: Lethal Lessons from LA, (1998), available at 
www.igc.orgltraclfeature/climate/pollutionlbox.html (visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter 
Lethal Lessons]. 
'08 Global Futures Foundation: Market-Based Environmental Laws: 100 Ways to Use 
Prices to Prevent Pollution (1997), available at http:www.globalff.orglfeature_articlesl 
previous_articles/pre-10Ow.htm (last modified Apr. 11, 1999) [hereinafter 100 WaysJ. 
This article quoted William K. Coors speaking on market-based environmental policy. 
'00 Id. 
'6' John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem 
and a Taxing Solution, 76 INn. L.J. 829, 840 (2001). 
'62 World Resources Institute: Economic instruments for pollution control and pre-
vention .. A brief overview by Duncan Austin, (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.wri. 
orglwrilincentives /austin.html (last modified: Apr. 03, 2000). "In shaping the early 
environmental policies of the 1970s, policy-makers instituted standard-based systems 
in keeping with prevailing legal traditions of dealing with activities deemed excessive 
by society (Spence and Weitzman, 1994). This "command and control" pattern of regu-
lation set uniform targets for how much firms should emit, often by dictating the proc-
esses that should be used in their facilities. Two broad types of command and control 
regulations are discernible: technology-based and performance-based (Stavins and 
Whitehead,1992)." Id. . 
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alternative to the traditional command and control approach. 163 
A report titled "Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Envi-
ronment: Initiatives for the New President" by Robert Stavins 
brought market-based incentives to the forefront of environ-
mental regulation.164 As a result, the market-based incentives 
approach was adopted in the 1990 CAA amendments as Title 
IV and eventually made its way into state regulatory programs, 
such as RECLAIM. 
From a policy standpoint, market-based incentives assign 
legal and financial responsibility to the party most responsible 
for creating the emissions. As a result, the more emissions 
created by the party, the more the party must pay. Conversely, 
if a party reduces its emissions, its costs are likewise reduced. 
This approach is thought to stimulate the free market by allow-
ing the parties responsible for the emissions to determine how 
to best utilize their monetary and natural resources. 165 Accord-
ing to Harvard University's Environment and Natural Re-
sources Program, market-based incentives can be "cost effec-
tive, minimizing the aggregate cost of achieving an environ-
mental target and can provide dynamic incentives for the adop-
tion and diffusion of better technologies."166 
Through market-based incentives, the cost of misusing 
and/or overusing a resource, such as ambient air, is external-
ized. Therefore, there is a major financial incentive for reduc-
ing resource misuse and/or overuse.167 Usually, installing in-
'63 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243,1245 
(1968). A theory has emerged to explain why market-based incentives are superior to 
command and control regulation. This theory is premised, in part, on the 1968 article 
by biologist Garrett Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons. Air, water, land and all 
other resources available for common use are typically free. By assigning economic 
value to a natural resource, efficiency would result because industry would regard 
consider it in their costs. By increasing natural resource efficiency, the outcome predi-
cated in Tragedy of the Commons is avoided. Id . 
• 64 Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government - Environmental & 
Natural Resources Program: Market-Based Environmental Policy, available at http://ks 
gnotes1.harvard.edulBCSlAIENRP.nsf7weblMktEnvIPol (last modified July 17, 2001). 
... 100 Ways, supra note 159. 
.... See supra note 164 . 
• 67 Jonathon R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradeable Allowances 
and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 479 (2000). See also 
Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Designing an Interna-
tional Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 160, 161 
(Winter, 2001). 
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novative technology to reduce or limit emissions is preferable to 
polluting when the cost of installing technology is less then 
buying the right to emit from another party.168 Ideally, innova-
tion spurs new technologies, which in turn results in emission 
reductions. 
In order to facilitate innovative technologies, enforcement 
of uniform standards must be equally borne by all parties un-
der the regulation. 169 A strict uniform maximum emissions 
level, coupled with the ability to trade, ensures continuous in-
novation. For example, a source's ability to sell excess emis-
sions rights to a party that needs them to comply with the en-
vironmental regulatory cap creates an incentive to develop 
cleaner technology.170 Further, the option to trade emission 
rights reduces the risks associated with innovation if the new 
technology fails.1 71 As a result, the emerging successful tech-
nologies and a decreasing overall cap reduce emissions and 
create a more efficient and productive process so that both the 
parties and the environment benefit.172 
Under a market-based incentives approach, a buyer may 
purchase additional emission rights from parties who have not 
used their allocated rights. Once the buyer purchases the right 
to emit from a seller, the seller no longer has the right to emit 
the quantity of emissions sold. Theoretically, this system of 
trading creates a pollution control system that is the most cost 
effectiveY3 When a party emits more emissions than author-
ized, the party has two options: (1) purchase additional rights 
to emit; or (2) suffer a non-compliance fine. The fine for exceed-
ing the emissions limit tends to be more costly than trading or 
process modification. 174 
The compliance system for a market-based incentives pro-
gram is imperative for the regulatory scheme is to be success-
ful. Ideally, the compliance scheme will encompass a continu-
ous monitoring system based on: (1) the regulated sources' re-
168 See supra note 161. 
169 See supra note 164. 
170 [d. 
171 Id. 
172 [d. 
173 [d. 
174 Id. The automation of the fmes for non-compliance is directly related to the sys-
tem for monitoring emission sales and purchases by the various buyers and sellers. 
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ported emissions and (2) the trading traffic reported by the 
overseeing entity. 
IV. CRITIQUE 
Having introduced some current programs and approaches 
by which a domestic GHG regulatory program might be guided, 
it is important to analyze whether these programs are suitable 
for the regulation of GHGs. This section explores each pro-
gram's weaknesses and strengths with respect to potential 
GHG regulation. 
A. NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS: 
INCORPORATING GHGs FOR REGULATION 
The EPA has identified six constituents for primary and 
secondary NAAQS regulation.175 Those constituents currently 
regulated under NAAQS include ozone (03), carbon monoxide 
(CO), sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen dioxide (N02) , particulate 
matter (PMlO), and lead (Pb).176 Because none of the GHGs are 
currently identified under NAAQS, the two factors for adding a 
new air pollutant must be considered: (1) the GHG's ability to 
reasonably endanger public health or welfare, and (2) the quan-
tity and mobility of the GHG's sources.177 
Looking at the fIrst factor, to determine a GHG's ability to 
reasonably endanger public health or welfare, reliable scientifIc 
data is necessary. As previously mentioned, scientific research 
1711 See EPA Green Book: Welcome to the Green Book: Nonattainment Areas for Crite· 
ria Pollutants (Aug. 16,2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbklindex 
.html (visited Jan. 2, 2002) !hereinafter Green Book]. 
17. [d. "Ozone (0.), a photochemical oxidant, is a major smog component. While O. 
in the upper atmosphere is beneficial to life by shielding the earth from harmful ultra-
violet radiation, high ground level concentrations are a major health and environ-
mental concern. Carbon monoxide (CO) is a colorless, odorless and poisonous gas pro-
duced by incomplete fuel burning. Nitrogen dioxide (NO,) is a brownish, highly reac-
tive gas found in all urban atmospheres. NO, irritates the lungs, causes bronchitis and 
pneumonia, and lowers respirator infection resistance. High sulfur dioxide (SO,) con-
centrations affect breathing and may aggravate existing respiratory and cardiovascular 
disease. Particulate matter (PM) includes dust, dirt, soot, smoke and liquid droplets 
directly emitted into the air by various sources. SO, and VOCs are also PM. Lead (Pb) 
exposure can occur through inhalation of air and ingestion of Pb.' Excessive Pb expo-
sure can cause seizures, mental retardation and/or behavioral disorders." [d. 
177 See supra note 113. 
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into the global warming phenomenon and the adverse impacts 
of GHG emissions is abundant.178 Therefore, it is possible to 
assimilate generalized scientific data that supports the premise 
that GHGs have the potential to reasonably endanger public 
health or welfare.179 GHG emission modeling shows that GHG 
emissions, individually and aggregately, adversely effect the 
environment.180 Scientists predict that if GHG emissions con-
tinue to rise, the natural environment will experience perma-
nent alterations that will force biota to either adapt or face ex-
tinction. 181 Using these findings and predictions, a tenable ar-
gument exists that GHG emissions have the potential to rea-
sonably endanger public health and welfare. 182 
Although generalized global warming data is available, 
specific studies on the ability of GHGs to reasonably endanger 
public health or welfare are, nonetheless, lacking. While an 
argument can be made that GHGs impact on global warming 
has the potential to reasonably endanger public health or wel-
fare, critics of global warming science will inevitably challenge 
the validity of such data.183 Furthermore, while numerous 
studies suggest catastrophic impacts will result from global 
warming, some studies suggest that global warming is a natu-
ral event that pre-dated anthropogenic GHGS.184 As the sci-
ence of climate change remains an unsettled and contentious 
arena in the United States, the express scientific support es-
sential to identify a GHG as an air pollutant for regulation un-
179 See supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text. 
179 FAQ, supra note 8. 
1BO S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a Dec. 1999 article). 
181 Sheet 6, supra note 9. See also FAQ, supra note 8. 
182 Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1055. The court will uphold the EPA's decision to add 
a new constituent for air quality regulation so long as its adoption is based on reason-
able extrapolations from some reliable evidence. Id. 
183 See, e.g., S5291-01, supra note 54. 
"" Ohio State Research: Viewpoint: Global Warming Natural May End Within 20 
Years by Pam Frost Gorder, available at http://www.osu.edulresearchnewslarchive/ 
nowarm.htm (last modified June 14, 2001). Dr. Robert Essenhigh, E.G. Bailey Profes-
sor of Energy Conservation in Ohio State's Department of Mechanical Engineering, 
believes that atmospheric CO2 is not the cause of global warming. Id. Based on his 
model, Dr. Essenhigh suggests the Earth may reach a peak in the current temperature 
profile within the next ten to twenty years, and then it could begin to cool into a new 
ice age. Id. 
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der NAAQS is unfortunately unlikely found from existing cli-
mate change science. 185 
However, if any of the six GHGs are capable of satisfying 
the "reasonably endanger" requirement under NAAQS, the 
identifiable and diverse source requirement could be easily 
met. 186 GHG emission sources are diverse and identifiable. 
The number of industries emitting GHGs into the atmosphere 
is great. 
Using C02 emission sources as an example, over 95 percent 
of C02 is generated by fossil fuel combustion. This 95 percent 
can be broken down as follows: 33 percent from electricity gen-
eration, 33 percent from transportation, 12 percent from direct 
residential and commercial use, and 20 percent from industrial 
use. IS7 The 33 percent of C02 emissions from transportation 
can further be broken down: 13.9 percent from direct combus-
tion of cars, 11.2 percent from direct combustion of trucks, 4.5 
percent from direct combustion from airplanes, 1.8 percent 
from direct combustion of ships, 0.6 percent from pipelines, and 
0.8 percent from railroads. 188 The 12 percent of direct residen-
tial and commercial use can also further be broken down: 9.3 
percent is attributed to gas and oil heating and cooling, 1.5 per-
cent to gas water heating, and 1.2 percent to gas appliances. 189 
Considering the statistical information on C02 emissions alone, 
it is clear that C02 sources are both diverse and identifiable. 
Therefore, there should be few, if any, obstacles to classifying 
C02 as an identifiable and diverse source for purposes of 
NAAQS. 
C02 is a representative example of the other five GHGs. It 
is unlikely that GHG regulation under NAAQS would be hin-
dered by the inquiry as to whether the GHG sources are identi-
fiable and diverse. The limiting factor, therefore, to regulating 
1M See supra note 182. The court will uphold the EPA's decision to add a new con-
stituent for air quality regulation so long as its adoption is based on reasonable ex-
trapolations from some reliable evidence. [d. 
!B6 See generally CRS Issue Brief for Congress IB97057: Global Climate Change: 
Market-Based Strategies to Reduce Greenlwuse Gases by Larry Parker (April 4, 2001), 
available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreportslClimate/clim-5.cfm (visited Jan. 2, 2002) 
(outlining the identifiable sources of greenhouse gas emission sources). 
IB1 [d. 
188 [d. 
189 [d. 
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GHGs under NAAQS is the "reasonably endanger" factor, 
which is ultimately at the discretion of the regulating agency. 
When Congress developed the statutory language creating 
NAAQS, GHGs emission issues were not yet contemplated.190 
In light of the limiting statutory language, the ability to regu-
late GHGs under NAAQS is debatable. Unfortunately, the spe-
cific scientific data to convince the EPA that GHGs reasonably 
endanger public health or welfare may not be available. The 
connection between the data and environmental impacts is 
likely too attenuated to warrant GHG regulation under 
NAAQS. 
B. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES 
PROGRAMS: A TEMPLATE FOR GHG EMISSION REGULATION 
While regulating GHGs under NAAQS may not be appro-
priate due to the difficulty in meeting the "reasonably endan-
ger" standard, Congress has the authority to promulgate a new 
program to meet the challenge of global warming. The Title IV 
program or the RECLAIM program may well be more suitable 
templates for the development of a new program to regulate 
domestic GHGs. 
1. Title IV as a Template for Regulating GHGs 
Title IV's establishment of allowances for fossil fuel electric 
generating plants has been widely praised as "one of the most 
successful environmental programs of the past decade."191 In 
fact, EPA's Title IV program is responsible for 50 percent of the 
total pollution reductions made in the last ten years.192 Title 
IV's noteworthy impact on pollution reduction stems from the 
program's very design; a design based on market incentives, 
namely the cap-and-trade system.193 Of various mechanisms 
100 See, e.g., 146 CONGo REC. H4823-02 (daily ed. June 21, 2000) (statement by Rep. 
Knollenberg referencing a Legal Affairs Committee Report on CO. regulation that 
stated "even though the most direct evidence shows that Congress did not intent that 
EPA regulate CO."). 
'9' Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An analysis of 
the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10411, 10411 (1996). 
'92 See supra note 134, at 162 . 
• 93 See, e.g., Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should 
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available to implement a GHG emission reduction and limita-
tion program, Title IV's cap-and-trade approach for SOx seems 
the most appropriate model. However, while the basic cap-and-
trade approach should be used in creating a GHG emission re-
duction and limitation program, the Title IV program could 
benefit from improvement. 
Whereas Title IV relied on only two years worth of data to 
develop the baseline, the GHG program should extend the 
baseline period beyond two years in order to compile a more 
accurate representation of emission productions. If the Title IV 
allowances provision is adopted under a GHG program, the 
method by which the allowances are established should also 
incorporate more than a mere two years worth of data. 194 Fur-
thermore, if ''bonus'' allowances are awarded under a GHG 
program, a more restrictive method of distributing allowances 
should be established.195 
Some aspects of Title IV do not, however, require im-
provement. Title IV requires new emission sources to purchase 
their rights to emit from existing sources to ensure that the 
maximum emission levels never increase beyond the maximum 
cap.196 This concept should be included in a GHG program be-
cause, if properly implemented and enforced, GHG emissions 
would never exceed the maximum cap that was established by 
way of the baseline. Additionally, the concept of retiring emis-
sions at the end of each year to reduce the overall cap should 
also be used in a GHG program.197 
The "trade" portion of the cap-and-trade program is also 
essential. A GHG program should adopt the general concept of 
Title IV's trading program for SOx, whereby parties buy, sell, 
or hold emission rights. 198 While the general concept should be 
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330, 10331 (dis-
cussion on Cap-and-Trade control of SOx). 
194 Byron Swift, How Environmental Law Works: An analysis of the Utility Sector's 
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxides under the Clean Air 
Act, 14 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 320. (2001). 
195 [d. at 325. Nearly 4 million bonus allowances were allocated during Phase I, 
which ultimately resulted in a bank of 11.6 million allowances saved for use in Phase 
II. [d. The allowance bank is not expected to be depleted until 2010. [d. 
196 See, e.g., supra note 124. 
197 [d. 
198 See generally Clean Air Act, Title IV, §403, 42 § U.S.C. 7651b (2001) (outlining 
the SOx allowance program). 
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adopted, changes should be made to improve pollution reduc-
tion. 
For instance, the ability to bank allowances should be lim-
ited and trading should be restricted in areas depending on the 
location of the purchasing party. A limit should be placed on 
the length of time that an allowance might be banked before it 
is forfeited. While establishing a time limit for the retention of 
allowances ensures emissions actually occur, it also accounts 
for "paper emissions". As for placing a limitation on location of 
trading, a GHG program will likely consist of six different regu-
lated constituents originating from areas where the constituent 
concentrations vary. First, parties should only be allowed to 
trade like constituents - C02 for C02, not C02 for N02. Second, 
a party should be limited to buying like constituents only from 
geographical areas that have equal or greater emission levels 
than that of the purchasing party. Third, trading should be 
monitored to curtail bursts of emissions purchases in particular 
areas where emission levels for the constituents are increasing 
rapidly. Temporary trading freezes might be used to curtail 
trading in "hot spots". 199 
Overall, Title IV has proven how successful market-based 
incentives environmental regulation can be when properly im-
plemented and maintained. Moreover, there are additional 
reasons why a GHG program should incorporate aspects of Ti-
tle IV. First, the power industry has become accustomed to 
operating under a cap-and-trade system and will easily adapt 
to like regulation under a GHG program. Second, the Title IV 
program produced results quickly: a 40 percent reduction in 
emissions with over a two percent growth in product.20o Third, 
the Chicago Board of Trade Future Market already handles 
trading of emissions. Fourth, the continuous monitoring sys-
tem has already been developed for Title IV and can be modi-
fied for a GHG program. Finally, almost all of the data needed 
to establish the maximum cap, allowance scheme, and trading 
scheme already exists because of annual GHG emission inven-
199 See generally Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SOx Hot Spots - Good News 
from the Acid Rain Program, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 954 (2000). A hot spot is an area suf-
fering from high levels of localized pollution. [d. 
200 See supra note 146, at 237. 
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tories. Thus, a similar market-based incentives approach for 
GHG regulation would undoubtedly prove equally successful. 
2. RECLAIM as a Template for Regulating GHGs 
While the Title IV program was largely successful in reduc-
ing emissions, the RECLAIM program is a sharp contrast. 
Since its inception, the RECLAIM program has failed misera-
bly to lower NOx and SOx emissions. During the period of 
1994 to 1996, while the projected pollution reductions were at 
thirty percent for NOx, the actual reductions were ten percent 
of the projected reductions: a mere three percent reduction in 
NOx emissions.201 NOx reductions prior to the inception of 
RECLAIM were actually greater. In fact, over the four-year 
period between 1989 and 1993, the LA Basin experienced a 37 
percent reduction in NOx emissions.202 
Some of the reasons for RECLAIM's failure include fabri-
cated paper reductions through industry overestimations, the 
creation of pollution hot spots, and outright fraud and manipu-
lation of emissions reporting. 203 The problems with RECLAIM 
were evident from its inception. When introduced, many of the 
regulated industries previously underestimating their emis-
sions began to overestimate their emissions to ensure that they 
had an emissions cushion. As a result, industries were able to 
emit beyond levels previously allowed. Therefore, even though 
RECLAIM recorded "reductions," they were merely paper re-
ductions.204 
While SCAQMD's RECLAIM program exemplifies an un-
successful market-based incentives program, not all market-
based incentives approaches should be discounted.205 By thor-
oughly reviewing RECLAIM's failures, an entity interested in 
201 Richard T. Drury, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' 
Failed Experiments in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 231, 275 (1999). 
See also Lethal Lessons, supra note 154. 
202 Drury, supra note 201, at 265. 
203 See, e.g., Lethal Lessons, supra note 158. 
204 Drury, supra note 201, at 233 (referencing paper reduction as "phantom"). 
206 See generally CorpWatch: Srrwke and Mirrors - Will Global Pollution Trading 
Save the Climate or Promote Injustice and Fraud? by Michael Belliveau (Oct. 1998), 
available at http://www.igc.org/traclfeature/ciimate/pollution/belliveau.html (visited 
Jan. 6, 2002). 
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developing a market-based incentives program for GHGs will 
avoid similar mistakes. For instance, a market-based incen-
tives program for GHGs could benefit from RECLAIM's mis-
takes by ensuring that it incorporates a method by which in-
dustry reporting of emission productions is incapable of overes-
timation. This could be accomplished by comparing the values 
reported to a baseline that uses a greater number of production 
years. This could also be accomplished by having the regulat-
ing entity conduct "random" spot inventory inspections, thereby 
assessing heavy civil and criminal liability for inaccurate re-
porting. Ideally, random spot inventories would serve as an 
incentive to estimate emission productions more accurately and 
would at the least reduce gross abuse of the reporting system. 
The creation of pollution hot spots is another RECLAIM 
failure worth avoiding.206 This unfortunate phenomenon could 
be avoided by placing trading freezes in areas where inordinate 
amounts of emissions are purchased in short periods of time. 
For example, if an emission source needs to purchase allow-
ances, but the area where the source is located is experiencing 
high levels of allowance purchases, the source would be re-
stricted from purchasing any additional allowances. A source 
confronting such a situation would have two choices: emit and 
face a stiff penalty for non-compliance or reduce emissions. If 
the non-compliance penalty were set at a level to severely dis-
courage non-compliance, the source would reduce emissions. 
Any GHG program premised on market-based incentives 
and created in the wake of RECLAIM should develop a more 
responsive system to avoid emission reporting fraud and ma-
nipulation. A few ways to avoid this problem include raising 
non-compliance penalties, developing a networked emissions 
reporting device that allows for spot-checking, and establishing 
random full-scale intensive emission production evaluations. 
Non-compliance penalty amounts could be set according to the 
severity of the emission reporting error. The compliance penal-
ties should allot greater penalties and liability for purposeful, 
206 However, the issue of a pollution hot spot may not even be a concern for a GHG 
program because the levels of emissions needed to have the potential to adversely 
affect human health or the environment may not even be reached. Additional data is 
needed to determine if a GHG emission hot spot is even possible. 
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excess emission production. A spot-check system should fur-
ther be developed to allow networking between the regulated 
entity and the emission sources. Under this network, the 
emission sources could only transmit emission data, whereas 
the regulating entity would have access to spot check emission 
data and make comparisons to determine whether to conduct a 
site visit. The third possibility for controlling fraud and ma-
nipulation would simply be to notify the emission sources that 
they always run the risk of being subject to a random spot in-
spection. This spot inspection would consist of a site visit 
where a full-blown emissions production evaluation would be 
performed. The evaluation would entail the sampling of emis-
sion production to determine the actual emission production of 
the sources along with an examination of the sources' proc-
esses. The process evaluations are necessary to determine 
which, if any, process modifications have occurred and whether 
those modifications were accounted for when reporting emis-
sion production. 
By examining the inadequacies of the program and imple-
menting the alternatives listed above, RECLAIM will be an 
invaluable tool for the creation of a new market-based incen-
tives GHG program. Through the careful considerations of the 
program's shortcomings, improved monitoring mechanisms will 
be developed, stricter compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
will be established, and trading restrictions will be enforced. 
These improvements to SCAQMD's RECLAIM program will 
serve as important and powerful tools in developing and im-
plementing an effective GHG reduction and limitation pro-
gram. 
C. MARKET-BASED INCENTNES: THEORY 
Turning from the analyses of the existing emission reduc-
tion programs and their suitability to regulate GHGs, it is im-
portant to determine whether a GHG program premised on 
market-based incentives is appropriate. Proponents of market-
based incentives programs consider the approach to be more 
than merely a cost-effective way to meet environmental regula-
tions; proponents believe the approach spurs innovative tech-
nologies to prevent pollution while increasing industry effi-
ciency. Opponents of market-based incentives, however, fIrmly 
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contend they do exactly the opposite.207 According to scholar 
David Driesen, a market-based incentives program stifles in-
novation by using a "cheap fIx."208 The "cheap fIx" Driesen 
complains of is the purchase of emission allowances in lieu of 
investing that same money in new technology.209 Even if a 
company decides to use Driesen's "cheap fix" approach, how-
ever, allowances are not infInite. Eventually, allowances will 
run out and all companies will have no choice but to reduce 
emissions. Companies are aware of the consequences of abus-
ing a market-based incentives program, as shown through the 
success of EPA's Title IV program. An overwhelming majority 
of companies regulated under Title IV implemented process 
changes, refIned the use of raw materials, and developed new 
pollution control technology.21o 
Another point of contention with the market-based incen-
tives approach to environmental regulation is public exclusion 
from the industrial pollution decision-making process. 211 Some 
opponents focus on the potential for a non-consenting member 
of the public to endure increased pollution because a company 
chooses to purchase allowances rather than reduce emis-
sions.212 While the public might not have choices regarding 
increased pollution, this problem is certainly not unique to 
market-based incentives. Technology-based limitations in tra-
ditional command and control regulation also have the poten-
tial to result in increased pollution. The only difference with 
technology-based limitations is that increased pollution is a 
result of a permit variance, a violation, or grandfather clause, 
rather than at the discretion of industry. 
In addition, market-based incentives regulations often in-
crease the public's participation in the regulatory process. As 
pointed out by proponents Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stew-
art, market-based incentives regulation requires an overall pol-
lution maximum (a cap) that forces the publi~ to consider the 
2fY1 See generally, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 
STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 300 (1995). 
2<l8 David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix: The Emission Trading Idea and the 
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. I, 18 (1998). 
209 Id. 
210 See supra note 193, at 10331 (footnotes 23-28). 
211 Drury, supra note 201, at 278. 
212 See generally Heinzerling, supra note 207. 
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valuation of environmental protection.213 Furthermore, in an 
effective market-based incentives regulatory scheme, the public 
can directly impact pollution levels of pollution by purchasing 
emissions and retiring them. This direct participation in pur-
chase and retirement of emission allowances is a feature 
unique to market-based incentives regulatory schemes. Short 
of filing a lawsuit, the traditional command and control ap-
proach to environmental regulation does not offer such a pow-
erful tool for the public to directly impact industrial pollution. 
Moreover, the typical lobby influences implicit to the command 
and control rule-making process, issuance of permits, and re-
quests for variances are eliminated.214 Improper influence 
cannot adversely affect the ability of a company to comply with 
an established pollution cap. At least in this respect, a market-
based incentives regulatory scheme is superior to the tradi-
tional command and control technology-based regulatory 
schemes.215 
Because market-based incentives programs give involved 
parties choices as to how to implement the emissions reduc-
tions and limitations, compliance is often much less expensive 
than mandates under command and control regulations. Well-
designed market-based incentives programs reward people and 
companies that grow in an efficient manner. In the end, the 
market-based incentives meet both economic and environ-
mental needs.216 
While market-based incentives may be an effective alter-
native to the traditional command and control approach to en-
vironmental regulation, if improperly implemented and main-
tained, they will fail to reduce pollution.217 If poorly designed 
and ineffectively implemented and maintained, the program 
will also fail to spur innovation and may well lead to increased 
pollution and corruption. Therefore, a market-based incentives 
213 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 189 (1988). 
214 CaBS R. SunBtein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 (1991) 
2.., See generally CaBS R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 
(1991). 
21. 100 Ways, supra note 159. 
217 See generally Drury, supra note 201. 
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approach can successfully reduce pollution only if the program 
is properly implemented and maintained.218 
Successful market-based incentives approaches must effec-
tively address program design, implementation, enforcement, 
and accurate monitoring.219 Potential pitfalls include inflated 
baseline emission levels, low credit prices, paper emission re-
ductions, manipulation, and outright fraud.220 For these rea-
sons, existing environmental regulatory programs developed 
under a market-based incentives approach have been both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful. As previously discussed, the EPA's 
CAA Title IV for Acid Rain was successful for these reasons 
whereas California's SCAQMD's RECLAIM was not. 
In spite of anticipated criticism from opponents, a market-
based incentives program is the most appropriate approach to 
the domestic regulation of GHG emissions. The sources of 
GHGs are primarily industrial and industry tends to respond 
more favorably to monetary incentives and efficiency. As such, 
a market-based incentives program would drive industries to 
become more environmentally efficient through a monetary 
incentive. Under this type of program, domestic GHG emis-
sions would inevitably stabilize. Stabilization is the first step 
towards permanent GHG emissions reductions. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Despite the Untied States' unwillingness to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol as written, the United States is nonetheless 
equipped to respond to global warming. Under a domestic 
GHG emission reduction and limitation program, the perceived 
unfair treatment of industrialized countries in complying with 
GHG regulation would be irrelevant. In addition, by basing the 
GHG program on market-based incentives, the potentially ad-
verse economic impact on the United States could be dramati-
cally reduced.221 Furthermore, since the United States is cur-
218 See, e.g., supra note 199. 
... CRS Report for Congress 98-563: Air Quality and Emission Trading: An Over-
view of Current Issues by David M. Bearden (Aug. 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.cnie.orgINLE/CRSreportslAir/air-27.cfm (visited on Jan. 2, 2002). 
220 See generally Drury, supra note 201. 
.. , Cf Bush Position, supra note 1, at 12-13. The report states that the "Kyoto Pro-
tocol fails to establish long term goals based on science, poses serious and unnecessary 
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rently responsible for over twenty percent of the world's GHG 
emissions, a domestic program regulating GHG emissions 
would undoubtedly reduce the alarming rate at which global 
warming is occurring.222 
Considering EPA's NAAQS is likely inappropriate for regu-
lating domestic GHGs, a new program is necessary. The EPA's 
Title IV and California's RECLAIM programs were also devel-
oped when existing, traditional command and control regula-
tion was either an unsuccessful or an inappropriate means to 
achieve regulatory compliance.223 The following is a proposed 
national GHG emission reduction and limitation program, 
modeled on Title IV and RECLAIM and premised on market-
based incentives. 
A. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION CONTROL INITIATIVE 
A number of factors can influence the effectiveness of a 
market-based incentives approach to environmental regulation, 
especially when attempting to fashion an effective GHG emis-
sion program from the cap-and-trade approach of market-based 
incentives. The three primary criteria, however, include pollu-
tion ownership, pollution valuation, and pollution control flexi-
bility. First, an "owner" of the emissions must be deter-
mined.224 The owner should be the party with the most direct 
control over the generation of the emissions. Second, it is es-
sential to develop a mechanism to allow the owner of the emis-
sions to buy and sell emissions as the party would any other 
property. 225 Third, the owner should have enough flexibility 
and authority over its emissions to determine how best to re-
duce or eliminate them.226 The government's role in this proc-
ess should be minimal as owners of the emissions have the 
risks to the US and world economies and is ineffective in addressing climate change 
because it excludes major parts of the world." [d. 
222 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Press Kit - The 
Hague 2000, available at http://www. unfccc.int.htmi (last modified June 21, 2001). The 
Unites States has experienced an 11.2% increase in Carbon Dioxide emissions between 
1990 and 1998. [d. Cf Bush Position, supra note 1, at 3l. 
223 See generally, e.g., Swift, supra note 123. 
224 100 Ways, supra note 159. 
225 [d. 
226 [d. 
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most knowledge of their particular process for emission reduc-
tion purposes. 227 
Once the initial criteria have been adequately defined, the 
next step is to establish the fundamental aspects of the pro-
gram. The fundamental aspects of the GHG Emission Control 
Initiative include the location of the emissions and owners, the 
quantity of allowable emissions, the necessary compliance and 
enforcement requirements, and the market incentives. Specifi-
cally, the program design will hinge on defining the geographic 
areas to regulate, identifying an emission cap, allowing emis-
sion trading, determining a compliance regime, and establish-
ing non-compliance penalties.228 
1. The Program Criteria 
a. Establishing Ownership of Pollution 
To establish who owns the pollution, it is imperative to 
look at the sources of the GHG emissions. A number of catego-
ries of sources within the United States are responsible for 
producing GHG emissions. The easiest sources to identify, 
based on current data, are the industrial sources. Industrial 
source categories already exist and are used to compile annual 
United States GHG emission reports and other air pollution 
regulation data.229 
The next step is to identify the individual producers of 
GHG emissions within a given source category.230 Using the 
chemical industry as an example, this program should rely on 
facility specific process flow designs produced by process engi-
neers for production purposes. These process flow designs 
could identify whether GHG emissions were produced through 
the source's process. Mter a positive determination as to GHG 
emission production, the facility would be identified as a GHG 
227 [d. 
228 See supra note 219. 
229 See generally National Technology Information Service Web Site Home Page, at 
http://www.ntis.gov (visited Feb. 24, 2002). Industrial Source Categories are referred to 
as Standard Industry Classification ("SIC") codes. [d. SICs are promulgated by the 
National Technical Information Service. [d. 
230 [d. 
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emISSIOn source. Following this identification, the facility 
would be designated as a GHG owner. 
Understanding that the chemical industry is not the only 
known source category for GHGs, the other identified GHG 
source categories would need to undergo a similar evaluation 
process. As for the appropriate party to oversee the evaluation 
process, there are a few choices. The federal government, 
through an overseeing regulatory agency such as the EPA, 
could employ and train individuals to properly assess various 
process flows. This would likely be extremely expensive and 
federal employees may be less equipped to make judgments 
regarding the emission of GHGs than those technical individu-
als in the particular fields within the specific facilities. 
Another option is for the federal government to hire ex-
perts from the field to complete the evaluations. While this 
method would reduce training-associated costs and likely pro-
duce more technically sound evaluations, the overall costs 
would be comparable with, if not higher than, hiring and train-
ing government employees. Contracting experts could result in 
substantial expenses because the government would have to 
pay an expert for his or her skills. Additionally, depending on 
the experts' particular industrial or political alignment, con-
tracting field experts might not provide unbiased evaluation 
results. 231 
An equally effective and less expensive method of source 
identification is allowing the source to make the determination. 
Technical employees of the particular field in a specific facility, 
such as a facility process engineer or a plant design engineer, 
would be able to identify its facility as a GHG owner in a more 
efficient manner than those discussed above. Obviously, this 
solution, while cost effective, raises concerns that a facility may 
misrepresent its status with regard to self-identification as a 
GHG owner. To alleviate such a concern, a regulatory agency 
simply imposes civil and/or criminal liability on an owner for 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Industrial sources are not the only sources of GHG emis-
sions. It is extremely difficult, however, to adequately identify 
.. , A way to counter the potential for bias in the completion of the evaluations is to 
impose significant civil and criminal liabilities for misrepresentation. 
45
DiLuigi: Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
738 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
non-industrial sources of GHG emissions and their actual 
emission levels. Moreover, industrial sources are currently 
responsible for a majority of GHG emissions, making a regula-
tory scheme that limits and reduces industrial GHG emissions 
most appropriate and most effective. 
b. Associating a Value with the Pollution 
Mter identifying industrial sources of GHGs and establish-
ing GHG ownership, the program must assign a monetary 
value to the emissions in order to give the owners an incentive 
to comply with the program. Since the emissions are reported 
numerically for the annual GHG emission reports, assigning a 
monetary value based upon a quantitative reporting volume is 
most appropriate. The cost association should not be too cum-
bersome, but should still be high enough to be effective. 
Because other market-based incentives programs have set-
tled on a dollar amount for a specific quantity of emissions, the 
GHG program could easily build from the other programs' 
valuation of a specific quantity of emissions.232 In keeping, the 
quantity of emissions should be set at a "per ton" value by the 
agency overseeing the program.233 The value for a ton of GHG 
emissions must be such that the GHG owner realizes the value 
of what they "own". To accomplish this, the G HG program 
should establish a per-ton monetary incentive in both the form 
of a reward and a punishment. 
The overseeing agency will need to set up the trading pro-
gram to establish reward and punishment incentives. A sys-
tem similar to the CAA's Title IV trading program would work 
wonderfully here. 234 The Chicago Board of Trade could easily 
serve as a trading ground for the monetary value of a GHG 
emissions ton. 
232 Clean Air Act, Title IV, §409, 42 U.S.C. §7651j (2001). Under the CAA's Title IV 
Acid Rain Program, regulated entities found in non-compliance are assessed a $2,000 
fine for each ton. [d. 
233 In order to establish a monetary value for a ton of GHG emissions, sufficient 
research must be completed to ensure that the value is not too low and not too high. 
... Supra note 232. 
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c. Flexibility in Pollution Control 
Allowing the GHG owner flexibility in how to comply with 
the program's cap is also an important aspect of ensuring the 
success of the program. Again, the source is probably the most 
equipped in determining various methods to meet the maxi-
mum cap set by the program. These facilities employ individu-
als that possess technological expertise. Design engineers, 
process engineers, and many others are capable of developing 
technology to reduce their facility's production of GHG emis-
SIOns. 
While the technology required to reduce emissions may not 
currently exist, implementation of this program would facili-
tate technological advances. In addition, industry is already 
aware of the issue of global warming through the emergence of 
global warming science and the United States' involvement in 
the development of the Kyoto Protocol. 235 Many industries 
have begun to explore methods by which to reduce the produc-
tion of various GHGS.236 
One method to help facilitate the initial development of 
clean technology in various industry source categories would be 
to sponsor workshops and seminars.237 These workshops and 
235 See, e.g., Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: US En-
ergy Companies Propose Carbon Dioxide Emissions Caps (December 7,2001), available 
at http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11519 (visited Jan. 2, 
2002). (Statement by PSEG Power President Frank Cassidy at a US Senate hearing on 
Tuesday, Dec. 4, 2001). Mr. Cassidy stated, "Members of our coalition share the view 
that the scientific evidence on climate change has progressed to the point where pru-
dent action on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is warranted. [d. 
236 S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry). Sen. Kerry stated "Fortu-
nately, more and more companies are stepping forward to solve this problem and lead 
the way where government won't. BP will reduce its emission to ten percent below its 
1990 levels by 2010. Polaroid will cut its emissions to twenty percent below 1994 levels 
by 2005. Johnson & Johnson will reduce its emissions to seven percent below 1990 
levels by 2010. mM will cut emissions by four percent each year till 2004 based on 
1994 emissions. And, Shell International, DuPont, Suncor Energy Inc., Ontario Power 
Generation have all made similar commitments." [d. See also Taking the Heat - Why 
Bush is Right on Kyoto - Treaty or Not, US Needs to Curb Greenhouse Gas, NEWSDAY, 
Jul. 29, 2001 at Currents and Books: Cover editorial (explaining that Major corpora-
tions such as Shell, BP and DuPont have entered into agreements with the Environ-
mental Defense organization to reduce emissions). Major auto makers here and abroad 
are also contemplating reducing emissions, not out of great concern for global warming, 
but because it will eventually make operations more efficient and ease their dealings 
with European governments. [d. 
237 Relying on seminars and workshops as one method to facilitate innovative tech-
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seminars would be held at various locations throughout the 
nation and would be industrial source category specific. The 
focus should be on the engineering aspects of improving proc-
esses to reduce GHG emissions. 
Workshops and seminars would facilitate the interaction of 
a number of highly qualified experts in their respective fields, 
whereby they could discuss various experimental methods for 
reducing GHG emissions. Moreover, the forging of important 
partnerships would occur, resulting in research and develop-
ment for new technologies to reduce GHG emissions in specific 
industrial processes. In addition to the innovation that would 
occur at such seminars and workshops, agency personnel would 
also be educated in the various industrial processes while form-
ing closer relationships with those very industries, thereby fur-
thering the cooperation necessary for achieving GHG emission 
reduction and limitation. 
2. The Program Design 
a. Establishing the Geographic Area of Regulation 
For a truly effective domestic GHG emission reduction and 
limitation program that can slow the global warming trend, the 
program must regulate GHGs throughout the. entire nation. 
EPA's prior experience overseeing other national air programs 
will be beneficial in the implementation of regulations for the 
GHG Emission Control Initiative. 
Dividing the country into different categorical areas is nec-
essary to ensure that the GHG program is effective and effi-
cient. This division is necessary because GHG production in 
certain areas of the country is greater than in other areas of 
the country. Moreover, because there are existing emission 
categories for air pollutants under NAAQS, the GHG emission 
categories could easily merge into the existing system.238 As-
nology to reduce and limit GHG emissions would require some funding from the agency 
overseeing the program. Such funding should be made available because the initial 
agency investment in such workshops and seminars would be invaluable as it relates to 
environmental compliance with a domestic program to reduce and limit GHG emis-
sions. 
238 See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Qual-
ity Planning and Standards: Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants, available at 
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suming, however, that the GHG Emission Control Initiative 
opts to establish three divisions instead of the five divisions 
outlined in NAAQS, they could simply be "minimal", "moder-
ate," and "extreme". 239 Each of these divisions would be specific 
to each individual GHG. 
The emission division categories will assist in determining 
if a trading freeze is necessary to avoid creating a GHG emis-
sion hot spot in a particular area. Additionally, special desig-
nations should be applied to GHG emissions within areas 
deemed to encompass important ecological sites, such as na-
tional parks. The special designation would simply serve as a 
"marker" for regulatory agencies to acknowledge that a GHG 
emission source is located within an environmentally sensitive 
area. 
b. Identifying an Emissions Cap 
The development of a baseline is necessary to identify an 
emissions cap for the GHG Emission Control Initiative. The 
United States already has information regarding the national 
domestic production of GHG emissions. That data helped estab-
lish the enumerated GHG emission reduction and limitation 
commitments found in the Kyoto ProtocoJ.240 Since compilation 
of the data is complete, utilization of that same data would be 
cost effective and efficient .. The information compiled for and 
submitted to the FCCC on April 11, 2000 considered the years 
1990 through 1998.241 Reliance on an eight-year period of time 
is adequate to establish a baseline. Moreover, if the United 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/ oaqps/greenbk/o3co.html (last modified Mar. 6, 2002) (listing 
the various types of designated classifications for criteria pollutants). 
239 An area of the country identified as "minimal" would be an area of the country 
where, in relation with the rest of the country, contributes only a small amount ofGHG 
emissions. A "moderate" area would be a part of the country that contributes an aver-
age amount of GHG emissions to the atmosphere as compared the rest of the country. 
The "extreme" designated areas would be those parts of the county responsible for the 
greatest volume ofGHG emissions. 
240 Kyoto, supra note 61. 
241 See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Emis-
sions Data, available at http://www.unfccc.intlresourcelghgistatrep2000.html(visited Jan. 2, 
2002) [hereinafter Emissions Datal. See also United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change: United States Emission Data, available at http://www.unfccc.intl 
resourcelghgistatrepOO/usaOO.pdf(visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter United States Emission 
Datal. 
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States uses the same scientific formulas and scientific data the 
rest of the international community is using under the Kyoto 
Protocol, it will face less criticism for opting out of the interna-
tional amendment. 
By taking the average emission production for each GHG 
over the eight-year period, a maximum cap could be estab-
lished. Although the values have fluctuated over the eight 
years, they have not differed drastically from year to year.242 
As a result, industry would have time to adjust while establish-
ing some actual reduction in GHG emissions. While the initial 
maximum cap for each GHG would be based on the eight-year 
period, it should not be the final cap. Ideally, subsequent caps 
will be for a period of ten years, but no longer than fifteen 
years. By the end of that ten-year period, the maximum cap for 
each GHG should be equal to the lowest total value reported for 
each GHG over the initial 8-year period. The final cap should 
be rigid and unchanging. 5-year periodic reviews conducted by 
the overseeing regulatory agency would allow for modification 
to the final cap under specific circumstances. 
c. Determining a Compliance Regime 
For the GHG Emission Control Initiative to be successful, 
compliance with both the 8-year max and the final cap is im-
perative. To establish an effective compliance regime, the pro-
gram will need a continuous monitoring program. The moni-
toring program must be capable of identifying non-compliant 
industries. Furthermore, to ensure an effective compliance 
regime, non-compliant industries will incur stiff civil and/or 
criminal liability for non-compliance. 
Monitoring GHG emissions, as seen in many industrial 
settings, is not easy to accomplish and many of the numbers 
gathered originate from estimates or projections.243 Although 
models are available to project the production of emissions of 
various constituents, the projections do not reflect the actual 
... Emissions Data, supra note 24l. 
... See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Qual-
ity Planning and Standards: Air Quality Monitoring, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oar/oaqps/modeling.html (last modified Sept. 6, 2001) (listing the various types of 
models for air quality purposes). 
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emissions entering the atmosphere. One way to effectuate ac-
tual continuous monitoring is to set up a sampling program. 
Sampling for actual air constituent emissions is time consum-
ing and expensive, but ultimately necessary to ensure that the 
GHG program is actually meeting its goal. 
The EPA has a number of approved methods for conduct-
ing air emission sampling for monitoring purposes.244 Using 
one of these methods for guidance, a similar EPA-approved 
method could apply to GHG emission monitoring. A uniform 
sampling method would be required. The data obtained 
through sampling would further require transmission to a data 
collection center for GHG emission compilation. The data col-
lection center would automatically post GHG emissions, which 
would connect directly to the trading mechanism for establish-
ing the value of the GHG emissions. Depending on the re-
ported emissions, the value for a ton of GHG emissions would 
change accordingly. 
While a data collection center would store the sampling re-
sults for overall compilation, individual sources would main-
tain their own tallies. Between the two systems established for 
storing data, the GHG owners would receive notification when 
they were close to reaching their established GHG emission cap 
for the year. Notification would occur three times: first, when 
the GHG owner was at its 75 percent GHG emission point, next 
when the GHG owner was at its 90 percent GHG emission 
point, and finally when the GHG owner reaches its emission 
cap. Upon notification that the GHG owner has reached its 100 
percent emission point, the owner would be issued an adminis-
trative compliance order instructing the owner that it could 
purchase available GHG emission rights from other GHG own-
ers or incur a fine for each ton of GHGs emitted in excess of its 
total emission right. To establish the fine amount, the oversee-
ing agency would rely on adequate data related to the economi-
cal value of emission rights. The value outlined in Title IV - a 
penalty of $2000 for each ton emitted beyond that authorized -
would be both appropriate and adequate.245 
244 See generally, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. E (1989) (National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Compliance Procedure Methods). 
245 See supra note 234. 
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In addition to receiving a fine for exceeding the established 
GHG emission cap for the year, the GHG owner would receive 
further penalties. The following year, the GHG owner would 
lose its right to emit the amount of tons emitted beyond its 
emission cap that the owner failed to purchase from another 
GHG owner.246 Realizing that failure to purchase emissions 
rights or remain within its emission limits will result in the 
loss of the right to emit in the future will ideally motivate com-
pliance. 
d. Emission Trading 
Once the emission cap is in place for each GHG, the over-
seeing regulatory agency will distribute an initial number of 
emission allowances to the existing regulated GHG emission 
sources. The initial number of allowances distributed should 
be sufficient to ensure a viable market for trading. However, 
the allowances should not be so extensive as to allow the GHG 
emissions sources to simply hold them without making process 
modifications, closing facilities, or instituting new pollution 
control technology to achieve compliance with the cap. 
Mter establishing the proper number of initial allowances 
for the existing GHG sources, the regulatory agency will over-
see emission purchases by new GHG emission sources. With a 
maximum cap in place and the emission allowances issued to 
existing sources, new sources must purchase GHG emission 
allowances from existing sources. Placing this limitation on 
new sources will force industry to develop methods to reduce 
GHG emissions if a new GHG emission source in that same 
industry is to be built. In limited circumstances, a new source 
should be able to petition the overseeing agency for allowances 
based upon its industrial process design. If a new industrial 
source has developed a novel method to limit GHG emission 
production through their process, the overseeing regulatory 
agency may, at its discretion, grant "experimental" emission 
allowances to this source. Removing the number of "experi-
mental" allowances for allocation from the accumulated non-
compliance allowances could facilitate this. Recall that a GHG 
... See supra note 136 (a similar plan was used here). 
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emission source that violates its emission limit loses its right to 
emit the number of tons of GHGs it was unable to purchase 
from the market.247 Obviously, a grant of experimental allow-
ances will not occur until non-compliance allowances accumu-
late tttrough enforcement actions. 
In addition to a new source's ability to purchase allowances 
or receive experimental allowances, all GHG emission sources 
should have the ability to bank allowances for future use. 
Nonetheless, the overseeing regulatory agency should impose a 
five-year limit on the length of time available to bank the al-
lowances before a source would forfeit them. A five-year period 
is appropriate because it would coincide with five-year permit-
ting and emission review cycles. 248 While establishing a five-
year limit on banking encourages trading and emission produc-
tion, the emission reductions would be more accurate because 
they would be actual, rather than paper, reductions. Addition-
ally, with the eventual lowering of the GHG emission cap and 
the retirement of allowances, forcing the sale or forfeiture of 
allowances after a five-year period would not increase overall 
GHG emission production. 
Another way to lower GHG emission production through 
trading is to allow non-industrial sources to purchase allow-
ances for retirement. For instance, an environmental group 
could purchase GHG emission allowances through the market. 
Once the group purchased the allowances and "retired" them, 
the allowances would never return to the market. By estab-
lishing a discount rate for the purchase of GHG emissions by 
non-industrial entities, the program would facilitate GHG 
emission retirement. However, monitoring of the number of 
discounted allowances offered annually for direct retirement is 
important. Making five percent of the overall allowances avail-
able for retirement would be appropriate for the first five years 
of the program. Thereafter, the overseeing regulatory agency 
would review and revise the percentage of emissions available 
2<, See supra note 136. See also supra note 246 accompanying text. 
.... See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Qual-
ity Planning and Standards: Title V Operating Permits, available at http://www.epa. 
gov/oar/oaqps/permits.htmi (last modified Aug. 3, 2001) (general explanation of a Title 
V operating permit). See also Clean Air Act Title V, §502, 42 U.S.C. §7661a(b)(5)(B) 
(2001) (permits shall not be issued for more than a five-year period). 
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for retirement as necessary to ensure that the market stays 
viable. 
Additionally, under certain circumstances, the overseeing 
regulatory agency should invoke freezes on trading to ensure 
market viability as well as emissions stabilization and reduc-
tion. By monitoring the purchasing and selling of emission al-
lowances to certain geographical areas, the overseeing regula-
tory agency will significantly limit, or possibly eliminate, the 
growth of GHG emission hot spots. By freezing the sale of al-
lowances to a particular industrial area, GHG emission sources 
will have to modify production or face non-compliance penal-
ties. In hot spots, non-compliance penalties should be more 
severe to encourage industry to modify production over incur-
ring non-compliance penalties. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Kyoto Protocol was proposed to meet the FCCC objec-
tive of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the global climate. While the United States has decided 
not to move forward with the ratification and implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol, a domestic GHG regulatory program that 
relies on market-based incentives would be an effective tool to 
address climate change issues at a domestic leveL Considering 
the current political platform for environmental issues in the 
United States, a market-based incentives approach to GHG 
reduction and limitation may actually provide a successful 
compromise between industrial and environmental concerns. 
Implementing a program such as the GHG Emission Control 
Initiative would help to slow the global warming process. Ide-
ally, the program would have lasting technological effects on 
industry, perhaps as significant as the development of the cata-
lytic converter was to car manufacturing. 
Furthermore, implementing a domestic GHG emission re-
duction and limitation program, such as the GHG Emission 
Control Initiative, would help re-establish the United States as 
a contentious player in innovative environmental reform initia-
tives. As the rest of the international community moves for-
ward with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
United States is likely to experience various forms of interna-
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tiona! social and economic backlash for failing to participate. 
The international backlash could be reduced, if not eliminated, 
by the adoption of a domestic program that would meet the ob-
jectives of the FCCC. 
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VII. APPENDIX: KYOTO PROTOCOL RATIFICATION STATUS249 
COUNTRY SIGNATURE RATIFICATION REMARKS 
OR ACCESSION 
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA 03/16/98 11/03/98 (R) 
ARGENTINA 03/16/98 09/28/01 (R) 
AUSTRALIA* 04/29/98 
AUSTRIA* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) 
AZERBAIJAN 09/28/00 (Ac) 
BAHAMAS 04/09/99 (Ac) 
BANGLADESH 10/22/01 (Ac) 
BARBADOS 08/07/00 (Ac) 
BELGIUM* 04/29/98 
BENIN 02/25/02 (Ac) 
BOLIVIA 07/09/98 11/30/99 (R) 
BRAZIL 04/29/98 
BULGARIA* 09/18/98 
BURUNDI 10/18/01 (Ac) 
CANADA* 04/29/98 
CHILE 06/17/98 
CHINA OS/29/98 
COLUMBIA 11/30/01 (Ac) 
COOK ISLANDS 09/16/98 08/27/01 (R) (4) 
COSTA RICA 04/27/98 
CROATIA* 03/11199 
CUBA 03/15/99 04/30/02 (R) 
CZECH REPUBLIC* 11/23/98 11/15/01 (Ap) 
CYPRUS 07/16/99 (Ac) 
DENMARK* 04/29/98 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 02/12/02 (Ac) 
ECUADOR 01/15/99 01/13/00 (R) 
EGYPT 03/15/99 
EL SALVADOR 06/08/98 11130/98 (R) 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 08/16/00 (Ac) 
ESTONIA· 12/03/98 
EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY* 04/29/98 05/31102 (Ap) (1) 
FIGI 09/17/98 09/17/98 (R) 
FINLAND* 04/29/98 05/31102 (R) 
FRANCE* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (Ap) (2) 
GAMBIA 06/01/01 (Ac) 
GEORGIA 06/16/99 (Ac) 
GERMANY* 04/29/98 05/31102 (R) 
GREECE* 04/29/98 05/31102 (R) 
GUATEMALA 07110/98 10/05/99 (R) 
GUINEA 09/07/00 (Ac) 
HONDURAS 02/25/99 07/19/00 (R) 
... See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol 
Ratification Status, available at http://unfccc.intiresource/kpstats.pdf (last updated 
June 4, 2002). 
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COUNTRY SIGNATURE RATIFICATION REMARKS 
OR ACCESSION 
INDONESIA 07/13/98 
IRELAND* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) (3) 
ISRAEL 12/16/98 
ITALY* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) 
JAMAICA 06/28/99 (Ac) 
ITALY* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) 
JAMAICA 06/28/99 (Ac) 
JAPAN* 04/28/98 06/04/02 (At) 
KAZAKHSTAN 03/12/99 
KIRIBATI 09/07/00 (Ac) (6) 
LATVIA* 12/14/98 
LESOTHO 09/06/00 (Ac) 
LIECHTENSTEIN* 06/29/98 
LITHUANIA* 09/21/98 
LUXEMBOURG* 04/29/98 05/31102 (R) 
MALAWI 01126/01 (Ac) 
MALAYSIA 03/12/99 
MALDIVES 03/16/98 12/30/98 (R) 
MALI 01127199 03/28/02 (R) 
MALTA 04/17/98 11111/01 (R) 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 03117/98 
MAURITIUS 05/09/01 
MEXICO 06/09/98 09/07/00 (R) 
MICRONESIA (STATES) 03/17/98 06/21199 (R) 
MONACO* 04/29/98 
MONGOLIA 12/15/99 (Ac) 
MOROCCO 01125102 (Ac) 
NAURU 08/16/01 (R) 
NETHERLANDS* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (Ac) 
NEW ZEALAND* 05/22/98 
NICARAGUA 07/07/98 11118199 (R) 
NIGER 10/23/98 
NIUE 12/08/98 05/06/99 (R) (5) 
NORWAY* 04/29/98 05/30/02 (R) 
PALAU 12/10/00 (Ac) 
PANAMA 06/08/98 03/05/99 (R) 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 03/02/99 03/28/02 (R) 
PARAGUAY 08/25/98 08/27/99 (R) 
PERU 11/13198 
PHILIPPINES 04/15/98 
POLAND* 07/15/98 
PORTUGAL* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (Ap) 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 09/25/98 
ROMANIA* 01105/99 03/19/01 (R) 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION* 03/11/99 
SAINT LUCIA 03/16/98 
SAINT VINCENT AND 
THE GRENADINES 03/19/98 
SAMOA 03/16/98 11127100 (R) 
SENEGAL 07/20/01 (Ac) 
SEYCHELLES 03/20/98 
SLOVAKIA* 02/26/99 05/31/02 (R) 
SLOVENIA* 10/21198 
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COUNTRY SIGNATURE RATIFICATION REMARKS 
OR ACCESSION 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 09/29/98 
SPAIN* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) 
SWEDEN* 04/29/98 05/31/02 (R) 
SWITZERLAND* 03/16/98 
THAILAND 02/02/99 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 01107/99 01128/99 (R) 
TURKMENISTAN 09/28/98 01111100 (R) 
TUVALU 11/16/98 11/16/98 (R) 
UKRAINE* 03/15/99 
UNITED KINGDOM 
AND IRELAND* 04/29/98 05/31102 (R) 
UNITED STATES* 11/12/98 
URUGUAY 07/29/98 02/05/01 (R) 
UZBEKISTAN 12/0398 
VANUATU 11120/98 10/12/99 (Ac) 
VIET NAM 07/17/01 (Ac) 
ZAMBIA 08/05/98 
TOTALS 84 74 
Notes: R = Ratification; At = Acceptance; Ap = Approval; Ac = Accession 
* Represents an Annex 1 Party 
(1) European Community: "The European Community and its Member States 
will fulfill their respective commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the 
Protocol jointly in accordance with the provisions of Article 4." 
(2)France: "The French Republic reserves the right, in ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to 
exclude its Overseas Territories from the scope of the Protocol." 
(3)Ireland: "The European Community and the member States, including 
Ireland, will fulfill their respective commitments under Article 3, paragraph 
1, of the Protocol in accordance with the provisions of Article 4." 
(4)Cook Islands: "The Government of the Cook Islands declares its under-
standing that signature and subsequent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international 
law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of the climate 
change and that no provision in the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating 
from principles of general international law. In this regard, the Government 
of the Cook Islands further declares that, in light of the best available scien-
tific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, it con-
siders the emissions reduction obligation in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol to 
be inadequate to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system". 
(5)Niue: "The Government of Niue declares its understanding that ratifica-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any 
rights under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse 
effects of climate change and that no provisions in the Protocol can be inter-
preted as derogating from the principles of general international law. In this 
regard, the Government of Niue further declares that, in light of the best 
available scientific information and assessment of climate change and im-
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pacts, it considers the emissions reduction obligations in Article 3 of the 
Kyoto Protocol to be inadequate to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system". 
(6)Kiribati: "The Government of the Republic of Kiribati declares its under-
standing that accession to the Kyoto Protocol shall in no way constitute a 
renunciation of any rights under international law concerning State respon-
sibility for the adverse effects of.the climate change and that no provision in 
the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating from principles of general in-
ternationallaw." 
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